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ARTICLES 
FUNCTION OVER FORM:   
BRINGING THE FIXATION REQUIREMENT INTO 
THE MODERN ERA 
Megan Carpenter* & Steven Hetcher** 
 
This Article examines the ways that contemporary creativity challenges 
copyright’s fixation requirement.  In this Article, we identify concrete 
problems with the fixation requirement, both practically and in light of the 
fundamental purpose and policy behind copyright law, and argue for a 
change that would amend the fixation requirement to better function in the 
modern era. 
Specifically, we conclude that a fair appraisal of the justifications for the 
fixation requirement provides little, if any, rationale for fixation except to 
the extent that fixation helps to separate idea from expression in 
determining the “metes and bounds” of creative expression.  Recent case 
law analyzing the transitory works exclusion in particular demonstrates 
that this component of the fixation requirement has become an ineffective 
demarcation of what it means to fix a work in the modern era and provides 
little guidance for statutory interpretation.  We reason that dropping the 
transitory duration exclusion for copyrightability would enable fixation to 
serve its essential purpose while not discriminating against important 
strains of contemporary creativity.  Furthermore, removing the transitory 
works exclusion would better equip copyright law to reflect the purposes of 
the Intellectual Property Clause in the U.S. Constitution.  Despite these 
considerations, if dropping the exclusion for transitory works is not 
practically feasible, we argue that it is nevertheless desirable to allow a 
flexible interpretation of statutory language in light of the purposes of 
copyright and allow transitory works to come into a safe harbor from the 
general fixation requirement for copyrightability under the aegis of the 
Visual Artists Rights Act.   
 
*  Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law and Intellectual Property (CLIP), Texas 
A&M University School of Law.  For useful comments and suggestions, I am grateful to 
Maggie Chon, Shubha Ghosh, Brian Holland, Mike Madison, and Peter Yu.  For research 
assistance, I am grateful for the assistance of Kathryn Allen, George Emery, Thomas 
Looney, and Benton Patterson. 
**  Steven Hetcher practices law in the District of Columbia and the State of Tennessee. 
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There is a tension between the law and the evolution of ideas in modern 
or avant garde art; the former requires legislatures to taxonomize artistic 
creations, whereas the latter is occupied with expanding the definition of 
what we accept to be art. . . .  In other words, the “plain and ordinary” 
meanings of words describing modern art are still slippery.1 
Judge David H. Coar 
INTRODUCTION 
Art is an important aspect of human creativity.  As such, and as 
recognized in the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
copyright has long sought to promote the creation of artistic works.  This 
proposition seems beyond cavil.  It is generally agreed that the purpose of 
copyright is to encourage creation.  The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that 
the “philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents 
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by 
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents 
of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”2  Indeed, it takes 
someone trained in copyright law not to suppose naturally that art should be 
one of copyright’s main priorities, since it is conventional to think of art as 
socially beneficial.  Great artists are celebrated, and many people expend 
significant effort to personally experience their works. 
Art has been federally funded in the United States since the Great 
Depression, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the Public Works of 
Art Project and the Federal Art Project, which provided jobs for artists until 
the beginning of World War II.3  In 1965, Congress created the National 
Endowment for the Arts, which has given more than $4 billion in grants to 
arts organizations.4  Support for the arts remains alive and well today.  At 
the 2009 reopening of the American wing of the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art, First Lady Michelle Obama urged, 
The arts are not just a nice thing to have or to do if there is free time or if 
one can afford it.  Rather, paintings and poetry, music and fashion, design 
and dialogue, they all define who we are as a people and provide an 
account of our history for the next generation.5 
Art displays constantly changing norms.  There is a general trend to 
expand the genres and media in which artists create further and further 
away from paint on a canvas.  Each new era of art has pushed the 
 
 1. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 WL 4449886, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
29, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 2. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 3. MARTIN R. KALFATOVIC, THE NEW DEAL FINE ARTS PROJECTS:  A BIBLIOGRAPHY, 
1933–1992, at xxi–xxv (1994). 
 4. See National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 
89-209, 79 Stat. 845, 846–47 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 951–960 (2012)); About the NEA, 
NAT’L ENDOWMENT ARTS, http://www.nea.gov/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 5. Michelle Obama, Remarks by the First Lady at the Ribbon Cutting Ceremony for the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art American Wing (May 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-first-lady-ribbon-cutting-ceremony-
metropolitan-museum-art-american-wing. 
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boundaries of both viewers’ diverse tastes and the law responsible for 
protecting those tastes.  Since the impressionist era, artists have developed 
new movements in art, including expressionism, cubism, fauvism, 
surrealism, abstract expressionism, and postmodernism.6  Artists affiliated 
with these twentieth century movements rejected representation and instead 
produced images whose subjects were less easily identified.7  Late 
twentieth-century and present-day artists have, however, shifted back 
towards recognizable content displaced into new contexts.8  Appropriation 
and conceptual works often intend to depict commonplace images whose 
meaning depends on the viewer’s response to these sorts of images.9  Many 
recent important pieces challenge traditional notions of museum display.10 
The “essential fairness of copyright law” reflects a sense that creative 
works equally deserve protection from unauthorized copying.11  However, 
as Charles Cronin has noted, “Since the late nineteenth century, when 
Impressionist painters challenged established tenets of Western art, works 
associated with many artistic movements that followed have . . . become 
increasingly problematic in terms of eligibility for copyright protection 
under U.S. law.”12  This is especially true for contemporary art that includes 
natural matter, performances, and pieces that are intentionally 
impermanent.13  The Seventh Circuit in Kelley v. Chicago Park District14 
recently highlighted the tension between contemporary art and copyright 
law when it noted that “not all conceptual art may be copyrighted.”15  This 
analysis must be tested by examining the limits of what works are 
copyrightable and, specifically, whether the fixation requirement, as it is 
interpreted by courts, provides a reasonable constraint on copyrightability.  
In addition, it is worth considering whether works of contemporary art that 
do not otherwise meet copyrightability requirements should be eligible for 
moral rights protection under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 199016 
(VARA). 
 
 6. Charles Cronin, Dead on the Vine:  Living and Conceptual Art and VARA, 12 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 209, 223 (2010). 
 7. Id.; see also Denis Dutton, Has Conceptual Art Jumped the Shark Tank?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2009, at A27 (describing contemporary conceptual art as “works we admire 
not for skillful hands-on execution by the artist, but for the artist’s creative concept”). 
 8. Cronin, supra note 6, at 224–25. 
 9. Id. at 225. 
 10. See id. (“One might have to step beyond the walls of the museum to experience 
many works of Conceptual art created over the past fifty years.”). 
 11. Katie Sykes, Towards a Public Justification of Copyright, 61 U. TORONTO FAC. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2003) (quoting Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 
134). 
 12. Cronin, supra note 6, at 213. 
 13. Id. at 213–14. 
 14. 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 15. Id. at 304. 
 16. Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 101, 106A (2012)). 
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As the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Kelley indicates, copyright fails to 
promote art in one very important respect17:  it fails to adequately protect 
contemporary art that is not “fixed” according to current interpretations of 
fixation under the Copyright Act.18  Fixation, according to the Copyright 
Act, requires that works are able to be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”19  Under this 
definition, not only are important strains of contemporary art “unfixed” 
because they are transitory in nature, but also because they often make a 
point of incorporating elements of change over time.  Dynamic elements of 
artistic works are not merely an unintended consequence but rather a deeper 
artistic feature often integral to the meaning of this art.  Given the 
seriousness with which society appreciates, values, and pursues fine art, it is 
puzzling, and deserving of an explanation, that copyright law implies that 
certain art is somehow not worthy of encouragement—in this case, art that 
does not satisfy the fixation requirement under interpretations of section 
101 of the Copyright Act. 
Would not Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes turn in his grave to know that 
his most famous contribution to copyright doctrine—the Bleistein 
principle—is being controverted, and increasingly so, as nontraditional 
unfixed art burgeons?20  In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,21 
Holmes warned that it is bad copyright policy for judges to determine the 
quality of art.22  He noted that the artists Francisco Goya and Édouard 
Manet were not appreciated in their time by society and thus likely not to be 
 
 17. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305–06 (discussing the requirement that being “fixed” is 
necessary for copyright). 
 18. Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012), 
[a] work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a 
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.  A work consisting of 
sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this 
title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903); see also 
Russ VerSteeg, Jurimetric Copyright:  Future Shock for the Visual Arts, 13 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 125, 134–35 (1994) (“There is something about the thought of a judge trying to 
evaluate an artist’s creativity that is troubling.”). 
 21. 188 U.S. 239. 
 22. Id. at 251.  Because each time period creates its own criteria, judges may not be 
sufficiently sophisticated to appreciate a specific work at a given time, particularly avant-
garde works:  “Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned 
the new language in which their author spoke.” Id. at 251.  On the other hand, judges may be 
too educated to appreciate the art desired by the general public.  As one art critic noted: 
  Nothing about 20th century art is as disturbing as its warring factions, its 
schisms and its accusations of heresy and illegitimacy.  The battle for modernism 
is far from over as long as large segments of our population continue to maintain 
that something is art only if it approximates the appearance of physical reality, or 
if it follows the strict rules of tradition.  And the battle for reason in art is not over 
as long as representational art is considered regressive or irrelevant by its very 
nature. 
THEODORE F. WOLFF, THE MANY MASKS OF MODERN ART 2 (1989). 
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appreciated by a judge either.23  Holmes’s remarks have been cited for a 
variety of propositions, but for present purposes, his use of Goya and Manet 
as examples illustrates that copyright should not seek to discern socially 
worthy art from art that is not, lest a potentially great artist go 
underappreciated.  Vincent Van Gogh is a classic example of an artist who 
enjoyed very little success during his lifetime (selling only one painting, 
some believe),24 but whose works became some of the most popular and 
influential in the twentieth century, including two paintings that are listed in 
the top ten most expensive paintings of all time.25  Fear of excluding art that 
may be socially valuable informs the argument that copyright should 
protect all art, which is a social good. 
The traditional view is that copyright incentivizes creation.  But because 
copyright law protects only “fixed” art, it fails to adequately incentivize an 
important form of contemporary art:  art that is “unfixed” according to the 
strictures of the Copyright Act. 
As the following discussion will demonstrate, this conclusion could lead 
to a significant policy shift:  elimination of the fixation requirement.  This 
Article, however, concludes that fixation is an important element of 
copyright law because it serves a functional purpose of delimiting idea from 
expression.  Unfortunately, many works of art are embodied in a particular 
expression, yet have transitory duration; those works of art are not 
copyrightable because they are not “fixed” under the Copyright Act.  Our 
normative argument, in sum, is that the “transitory duration” exclusion 
should be abolished from the statutory definition of fixation.  This would 
allow copyright law to protect important classes of contemporary art while 
retaining the functional benefits of the fixation requirement.26  As an 
alternative, this Article proposes a policy change that is narrowly tailored to 
address the immediate problem of a lack of copyright protection for certain 
forms of contemporary art.  Such a policy change is not without important 
precedent in U.S. copyright law.  The most significant example is, of 
course, section 106A:  the moral rights provision of the Copyright Act, 
which protects works of visual art.27  If eliminating the transitory duration 
 
 23. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251. 
 24. Vasko Kohlmayer, The Red Vineyard:  The Only Picture Vincent van Gogh Ever 
Sold, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2011), http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/
vasko-kohlmayers-globe/2011/aug/2/red-vineyard-picture-vincent-van-gogh-sold. 
 25. See Jethro Mullen, New Van Gogh Painting Discovered:  ‘Sunset at Montmajour,’ 
CNN (Sept. 9, 2013, 5:37 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/09/world/europe/netherlands-
van-gogh-new-painting/ (“During the art market boom of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
three of van Gogh’s works succeeded each other as the most expensive paintings ever sold:  
‘Sunflowers’ for $39.9 million, ‘Irises’ for $53.9 million and ‘Portrait of Dr. Gachet’ for 
$82.5 million.”). 
 26. According to the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright protection subsists in “original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).  This 
statute establishes the requirements for copyrightable subject matter.  The ones at issue for 
contemporary art are (1) fixation and (2) authorship. 
 27. Id. § 106A. 
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requirement has negative policy implications, then removing the 
requirement in the more limited domain of contemporary art, perhaps by 
means of amending section 106A, may nonetheless improve on the status 
quo. 
One response to these proposals might be to observe that both would 
seem to suffer from the impossible task of defining art.  As will be 
discussed below, this issue is not to be minimized.  Nevertheless, section 
106A functions despite limited scope of coverage; “visual art” and vague 
tests, such as “recognized stature” of the work, determine the basic scope of 
the coverage.  While section 106A broadens the scope of owners’ rights, it 
does not affect the test for ownership rights in the first place.  By contrast, 
eliminating the transitory duration limitation for contemporary art opens up 
a new frontier for claiming private ownership of highly original and 
important contemporary art.  Restricting the policy shift to the subject 
matter of section 106A would apply to works that are “visual works” of 
“recognized stature.”28 
The discussion proceeds as follows.  First, this Article examines types of 
contemporary art that are not protected by copyright under the terms of the 
statute.  This Article then explores why copyright law includes a fixation 
requirement.  The main arguments in favor of the fixation requirement that 
this Article considers are:  First, that fixation is an implied requirement 
under the U.S. Constitution.  Second, that fixation serves an important 
evidentiary role in copyright law.  And third, that fixation plays a role as a 
gatekeeper for a low originality standard. 
This Article concludes that a fair appraisal of these arguments provides 
little or no rationale for the fixation requirement—except to the extent that 
fixation helps separate idea from expression and determine the “metes and 
bounds” of creative expression.  Dropping the “transitory duration” 
exclusion would enable fixation to serve this essential purpose while not 
discriminating against important strains of contemporary art.  Recent case 
law analyzing the transitory duration limitation demonstrates that the 
requirement has become an ineffective gauge of what it means to “fix” a 
work in a digital age, and provides little guidance for statutory 
interpretation.  Removing the requirement would better align copyright law 
with the purposes of the Intellectual Property Clause in the U.S. 
Constitution. 
If, alternatively, one concludes that dropping the transitory duration 
requirement is unfeasible, this Article argues that the Visual Artists’ Rights 
Act should provide, for transitory works, a safe harbor from the fixation 
requirement.  In sum, this Article explores two ways to “fix” the fixation 
requirement for contemporary art:  First, by moving away from the “more 
than a transitory duration” test.  Second, by amending VARA to protect 
statutorily “unfixed” works of contemporary art. 
 
 28. See id. 
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I.  IMPORTANT STRAINS OF CONTEMPORARY ART ARE NOT PROTECTED 
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT 
Works that do not receive copyright protection because they do not 
satisfy the fixation requirement represent an important segment of 
contemporary art.  Significant and influential contemporary artists create 
entire bodies of work that are never fixed under the terms of the Copyright 
Act.  Mainstream contemporary art often emphasizes process over product, 
where the process itself defines the core of the art, and the art does not 
result in some tangible “product.”  These works span various categories 
covered by copyright, including, inter alia, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works, pantomime and choreography, and dramatic works. 
A.  Sculpture with Natural Media 
Natural media is commonly used as a tool of expression in contemporary 
art.  Indeed, land art has developed a prominence in major museums; the 
Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles, for example, curated an 
exhibition in 2012 called “Land Art to 1974,” which purported to be the 
first large-scale, historical-themed exhibition to feature land art before it 
became a fully institutionalized category of modern art.29  The show 
included over eighty artists and projects from around the world.30 
Andy Goldsworthy, a British artist living in Scotland, is one of the most 
famous contemporary land artists.31  He uses exclusively natural objects, 
incorporating materials such as wood, stone, and ice with tools such as 
thorns, saliva, and water to create temporary and constantly changing works 
that explore themes of time, destruction and decay, rebirth, and the natural 
environment.32  Both the viewer and the environment become participants 
in the art piece itself.  Goldsworthy describes his work as follows: 
Movement, change, light, growth and decay are the lifeblood of nature, 
the energies that I try to tap through my work.  I need the shock of touch, 
the resistance of place, materials and weather, the earth as my source.  
Nature is in a state of change and that change is the key to understanding.  
I want my art to be sensitive and alert to changes in material, season and 
weather.  Each work grows, stays, decays.  Process and decay are implicit.  
Transience in my work reflects what I find in nature.33 
In this passage, the artist elegantly invokes transience as key to his artistic 
approach.  Works such as Goldsworthy’s are not fixed under the Copyright 
Act because they are of “transitory duration.”  One ephemeral piece that 
Goldsworthy creates in different environments and with different materials 
begins with construction of a cairn on the shoreline between the ebb and 
 
 29. See Ends of the Earth:  Land Art to 1974, MOCA, http://www.moca.org/landart/ 
(follow “About the Exhibition” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Andy Goldsworthy, CASS SCULPTURE FOUND., http://www.sculpture.org.uk/artist/
119/andy-goldsworthy (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Andy Goldsworthy, MORNING EARTH, http://www.morning-earth.org/
ARTISTNATURALISTS/AN_Goldsworthy.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
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flow of the tide.34  Goldsworthy must complete this structure in a very 
limited amount of time according to the tide.35  When the tide flows back in 
the work evolves further.  For a cairn made of sticks, the tide may carry it 
out to sea where it stays together for a time but gradually begins wearing 
away.36  For a cairn made of stones, the tides may beat against it as it wears 
down over the ensuing hours.37  In another piece, Goldsworthy collects 
leaves and attaches them together with thorns in a long serpentine shape.38  
He sends this wending serpent down a river, where the leaves interact with 
each other, the current, and the rocks above and below, in a dialogue with 
the natural environment.  Throughout the progression of the piece, the 
leaves break apart in segments and return to the earth. 
The core of each of these pieces of art lies in the process and effect of 
constant change.  Goldsworthy’s art is important—not just under the 
Bleistein principle—but as recognized by contemporary critics:  he has won 
both national and international awards; he has made temporary installations 
in some of the world’s leading museums; and he has created commissioned 
works in countries around the world.39 
Goldsworthy’s ephemeral art is unfixed under section 101 of the 
Copyright Act because it focuses on the transitory duration of nature.  
Goldsworthy photographs or videotapes each work once at a certain 
moment in the process, seeking to show the piece “at its height, marking the 
moment when the work is most alive.”40  While “[t]here is an intensity 
about a work at its peak that [he hopes] is expressed in the image,”41 even if 
aspects of process and decay are somehow implicit, the digital image or 
stream is not the art itself.  While such photographs have the effect of 
“fixing” the work for copyright purposes, the work itself remains unfixed 
according to the statutory language.  Any fixation of the piece, as that is 
understood in copyright terms, is merely representational of the piece rather 
than the piece itself—a fixation by proxy.  To highlight the distinctiveness 
of Goldworthy’s brand of creation in this respect, contrast this situation 
with, for instance, the Mona Lisa, in which the fixed work is the work. 
Other artists working with natural media suffer a similar fate under the 
Copyright Act.  James Turrell works in the media of light and space. He is 
one of the most critically acclaimed artists working today and has received 
both Guggenheim and MacArthur fellowships; critics have described him as 
 
 34. Campus Sculpture Tour:  Andy Goldsworthy, GRINNELL COLL., http://web.grinnell.
edu/faulconergallery/CampusArt/goldsworthy.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 35. See id. 
 36. RIVERS AND TIDES:  WORKING WITH TIME (Mediopolis Films 2004). 
 37. See id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Goldsworthy, Andy, NAT’L GALLERY ART, http://www.nga.gov/content/ngaweb/
Collection/artist-info.28027.html?artistId=28027&pageNumber=1 (last visited Mar. 25, 
2014). See generally Andy Goldsworthy, supra note 33. 
 40. Stacey Trujillo, Andy Goldsworthy, 3D RES. BLOG, http://sculptureresearch.
wordpress.com/andy-goldsworthy (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 41. Id. 
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one of the “most multifaceted artists of our time.”42  His installations in 
museums and galleries use the medium of light to make apparently solid 
objects seem to be hung from walls or suspended in air.43 While pieces may 
appear to be made of matter, they are comprised of light and ephemeral in 
nature.  He explains, “I like to use light as a material, . . .  but my medium is 
really perception.  I want you to sense yourself sensing.  To see yourself 
seeing.  To be aware of how you are forming the reality you see.”44  In 
1980, the Whitney Museum of American Art featured an exhibition that 
became well known because a visitor to the museum tried to lean against 
one of Turrell’s pieces and fell through it, breaking her wrist.45 
Turrell is renowned for creating skyspaces that enclose the participant to 
control the perception of light and space.46  He constructs an environment, 
often with an opening in the ceiling and benches along the walls, carefully 
manufactured to frame light in a certain way.47  The art takes place not just 
through the medium of the physical structure but in the constantly fluid 
space between perception and reality.  Turrell explains, “I want to put you 
directly in front of light, so you see it with your own eyes, not through my 
eyes.”48  Turrell’s art focuses on “light as a physical presence, a material in 
its own right, not just something that illuminates the rest of the world.”49  
Like Goldsworthy, Turrell’s inclusion of ephemeral natural media may 
preclude copyright protection for his works per se.  The dynamic nature of 
his art would likely fail to satisfy the fixation requirement because of the 
transitory works exclusion.  While he can fix his works by proxy, the works 
themselves—no matter how important to the art world or respected by 
critics—arguably remain outside the realm of copyright. 
B.  Performance Art/Pantomime 
Marina Abramović is a third example of a contemporary artist seeking to 
avoid traditional, object-based art materials such as paint and canvas that 
create a distance between the artist and the audience.  Abramović has 
chosen to cut out the middleman by using her own body as the medium for 
her visual art. She has had solo shows at major museums in the United 
States and Europe and has also participated in large-scale exhibitions such 
as the Venice Biennale and the Whitney Biennial, winning the Golden Lion 
Award at the Venice Biennale in 1997 for her video installation and 
 
 42. Michael Govan, James Turrell, INTERVIEW, June 2011, at 100, 104. See generally 
James Turrell, ART 21, http://ec2-75-101-145-29.compute-1.amazonaws.com/art21/artists/
james-turrell (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 43. Paul Trachtman, James Turrell’s Light Fantastic, SMITHSONIAN MAG., May 2003, at 
86, 88. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 90. 
 46. See Govan, supra note 42, at 105. 
 47. Trachtman, supra note 43, at 90. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
2014] FUNCTION OVER FORM 2231 
performance piece entitled Balkan Baroque.50  In 2004, Abramović 
received an honorary doctorate from the Art Institute of Chicago.51  In 
2010, the Museum of Modern Art in New York (MoMA) selected her 
works for a major retrospective exhibition.52  At the MoMA retrospective, 
which involved a simultaneous display of several of her works, she was 
only able to perform one piece; thus, more than forty other artists, under her 
intense training, reperformed pieces of hers throughout the museum.53  It 
was the first live reperformance of her works by other people ever 
undertaken in a museum setting.54 
Abramović herself performed a piece entitled The Artist Is Present, in 
which she sat in a chair for six days a week, seven hours a day, during each 
day that the museum was open between March 14 and May 31, 2010.55  
People who attended the museum were invited to participate in the art by 
sitting in a chair opposite her for a duration of their choosing, thus 
contributing to the creation of the art piece itself.56  Approximately 1,400 
people came to participate in the piece, including celebrities such as Sharon 
Stone, Bjork, Isabella Rossellini, Lou Reed, Rufus Wainwright, and 
Christiane Amanpour.57  The exhibition was immensely popular; the 
MoMA estimates that half a million people visited all or part of the 
retrospective, and a live feed on their website had close to 800,000 hits 
before the show closed.58  A Flickr site that contains headshots of every 
person who came to sit with Abramović was accessed close to 600,000 
times.59 
From Goldsworthy to Turrell to Abramović, from the earth to the sky to 
the body within, these artists and their media are not isolated examples but 
 
 50. See Maria Abramović, SEAN KELLY GALLERY, http://www.skny.com/artists/marina-
abramovi/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. The Artist Is Present:  Marina Abramović, MOMA, http://www.moma.org/
interactives/exhibitions/2010/marinaabramovic/retreat_participants.html (last visited Mar. 
25, 2014). 
 54. Marina Abramović:  The Artist Is Present, MOMA, http://www.moma.org/visit/
calendar/exhibitions/965 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 55. Marina Abramović:  The Artist Is Present—Portraits, MOMA, http://www.moma.
org/interactives/exhibitions/2010/marinaabramovic/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 56. A series of posts featuring videos, photographs, and interviews with the artist herself 
and some of the audience members and participants are available at the MoMA blog 
Inside/Out, MoMA, http://www.moma.org/explore/inside_out/category/marina-abramovic 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2014).  The artist herself noted that people sat with her for varying 
lengths of time, from two minutes to at least 391 minutes. Katie Notopoulos, Marina 
Abramović Made Me Cry, http://marinaabramovicmademecry.tumblr.com/ (last visited Mar. 
25, 2014) (showcasing pictures taken at the MoMA exhibition of audience members who 
cried while participating, along with the length of time they spent across from the artist); see 
also Jim Dwyer, Confronting a Stranger, for Art, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2010, at MB1; Marina 
Abramović:  The Artist Is Present—Portraits, supra note 55 (featuring a video with portraits 
of each person who participated in the piece). 
 57. Holland Cotter, 700-Hour Silent Opera Reaches Its Finale at MoMa, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 31, 2010, at C1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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represent strong currents in the contemporary arts world.  The list could go 
on and on.  Another example is Richard Long, who is a painter, 
photographer, and winner of the Turner Prize on multiple occasions.60  His 
piece called A Line Made by Walking is one of his most famous.  For that 
piece, he walks and walks over the same land and makes a line.61  The art, 
as he describes it, is not the line itself but the finite process of creating an 
impression in the earth, as his feet and the earth and his thoughts, the 
heaviness or lightness of his step, meet time and again.  In the end, there is 
a line—but the line is not the art, the process is the art.62  Despite these 
artists’ acclaim, their work is not copyrightable.  These artists’ dynamic, 
rather than static, use of natural materials prevents their works from being 
fixed under section 101 of the Copyright Act. 
C.  Sculpture with Living Materials 
Numerous artists have begun to create works that incorporate live 
elements from nature.  These works are part of a new movement called 
bioart that explores the intersection of art and science.  Bioart is composed 
of living things, such as live tissues, bacteria, or living organisms, or is 
created in conjunction with living things.63  The works are produced in 
laboratories and artists’ studios.  As Brooke Oliver explains, “In some 
ways, these pieces are one-of-a-kind originals like traditional sculpture, yet 
they grow and change in response to their controlled environments.”64  
Bioartists use sculptures and images that incorporate bioengineered living 
forms to bring about ethical, social, and esthetic inquiry.65 
Bioart can take a wide variety of forms.  Victimless Leather was a tiny 
jacket made up of a biodegradable polymer matrix in the shape of a doll’s 
jacket covered in a layer of living tissue made of embryonic stem cells 
taken from mice.66  By growing living tissue into a leather-like material, the 
artists hoped to start discussion of the moral implications of wearing parts 
 
 60. See Richard Long, GUGGENHEIM, http://www.guggenheim.org/new-york/collections/
collection-online/show-full/bio/?artist_name=Richard%20Long (last visited Mar. 25, 2014); 
Richard Long Artist Biography, TATE, http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artists/richard-long-
1525/text-artist-biography (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).  Long has also been nominated 
multiple times for the Turner Prize. 20 Years of the Turner Prize, GUARDIAN, 
http://arts.theguardian.com/pictures/0,,1062817,00.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 61. Richard Long Artist Biography, supra note 60. 
 62. See id. 
 63. GEORGE GESSERT, GREEN LIGHT:  TOWARD AN ART OF EVOLUTION 1 (2010).  
Examples of life forms that have been utilized in art include:  grasses, trees, bacteria, fungi, 
fish, frogs, fluorescing tadpoles, crabs, fly larvae, algae, horses, honeybees, pigeons, plant 
seeds and bedding plants, ants, protozoa, spiders, earthworms, maggots, caterpillars and 
butterflies, orchids, elephants, dogs, chickens, silkworms, culinary herbs, turtles, mice, and 
scorpions. Id. at 2. 
 64. Brooke Oliver, New Media Art Works:  BioArt, Digital Media, Installations & 
CopyLeft 6 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.osrfirm.com/bios/
pubs/New%20Media%20Paper%20071408.pdf. 
 65. Id. at 1. 
 66. John Schwartz, Museum Kills Live Exhibit, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2008, at F3. 
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of dead animals and humans’ responsibility to other living things.67  The 
piece garnered great attention when the MoMA curator had to decide to 
“turn off the life-support system for the work, basically ‘killing’ it.”68  As 
the curator put it, “I’ve always been pro-choice and all of a sudden I’m here 
not sleeping at night about killing a coat . . . That thing was never alive 
before it was grown.”69 
Many other artists incorporate living elements into their pieces.  Damien 
Hirst, incidentally said to be the world’s richest living artist,70 has created a 
work that manifests an entire life cycle, from gestation through death.  In 
his work A Thousand Years, maggots hatch inside a white box, turn into 
flies, and feed on a severed cow’s head on the floor of a glass case.71  An 
electric fly killer hangs inside the case from above; hatched flies buzz 
about, some meeting their end through electrocution, and some surviving to 
continue the cycle of the piece.72  There is no question that there is an 
expression in Hirst’s piece, a “work,” but yet the dynamic nature of the 
piece precludes copyright. 
Artist George Gessert explores the overlap between art and genetics.  His 
exhibits often involve hybridizing plants, often irises, or documentation of 
breeding projects.73  Gessert is predominantly interested in plant aesthetics 
and the many ways in which human aesthetic preferences affect plant 
evolution.74  Eduardo Kac also generated novel life forms in a work entitled 
Alba, a rabbit that fluoresces green under a specific blue light.75  He did so 
by implanting the rabbit with a green fluorescent protein gene from a type 
of jellyfish.76 
To expect copyright to be neither under- nor overinclusive is 
unreasonable.  And copyright law may rightfully exclude certain forms of 
art at the margins—artists will always push the envelope beyond the 
boundaries of copyrightability.  The types of art discussed in this Article, 
however, are particularly notable because they are at the forefront of an 
important movement in contemporary art emphasizing process over 
product, are created by some of the most well-respected artists in the world, 
and are featured in world-class museums.  Notably, conflicts surrounding 
 
 67. Victimless Leather:  A Prototype of Stitch-less Jacket Grown in a Technoscientific 
“Body,” TISSUE CULTURE & ART PROJECT (2004), http://tcaproject.org/projects/victimless/
leather. 
 68. Helen Stoilas, MoMa Exhibit Dies Five Weeks into Show, ART NEWSPAPER, May 
2008, at 1 (alteration in original). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Joy Yoon, The 15 Richest Living Artists, COMPLEX (Feb. 3, 2012, 11:27 AM), 
http://www.complex.com/art-design/2012/02/the-15-richest-living-artists/damien-hirst. 
 71. See A Thousand Years, DAMIEN HIRST, http://www.damienhirst.com/a-thousand-
years (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See generally George Gessert, On Exhibiting Hybrids, CIRCA, Winter 1999, at S08. 
 74. Id. at S09. 
 75. Oliver, supra note 64, at 10.  The ethics of creating art with living subjects is 
fascinating but outside the scope of this Article. 
 76. Id. 
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contemporary art and the fixation requirement are beginning to arise in 
court. 
D.  Contemporary Art in the Courts 
Courts are beginning to confront problems with the application of the 
“transitory duration” limitation to renowned works of art.  Chapman Kelley, 
the plaintiff in Kelley v. Chicago Park District, is an artist known for his 
representational paintings of foliage, particularly elliptical outlines 
surrounding landscapes and flowers.77  In 1983, he was asked to install a 
wildflower display in Chicago, Illinois.78  The result was Wildflower Works, 
composed of two giant elliptical flowerbeds, approximately a football field 
in size, featuring a wide variety of native wildflowers set within borders of 
gravel and steel.79  Kelley selected between forty-eight and sixty species of 
self-sustaining wildflowers for the piece, and he designed the initial 
placement of the wildflowers so they would “blossom sequentially, 
changing colors throughout the growing season and increasing in brightness 
towards the center of each ellipse.”80  Kelley sued the Chicago Park District 
for violating his moral right of integrity under VARA when the Park 
District decreased the size of Wildflower Works to less than half its original 
size, made the elliptical borders rectilinear, and replanted the wildflowers in 
a smaller garden without his approval.81 
This case, decided in February 2011, has important legal implications for 
contemporary art.  The court ruled that the carefully designed elliptical 
gardens failed to satisfy the level of fixation required for copyrightability.82  
It found that “[a] garden’s constituent elements are alive and inherently 
changeable, not fixed.”83  Even though Wildflower Works could satisfy the 
definition of fixation because it could be “perceived for more than a 
transitory duration,” the court still held that it lacked fixation because its 
essence was dynamic.84  The work did not vary minute to minute; instead it 
“moves gradually, over days, weeks, and season to season,” but the nature 
of the chosen medium precluded copyright of the final product.85  
Surprisingly, the court found that the “barrier to copyright [was] not 
temporal but essential.  The essence of a garden is its vitality, not its 
fixedness.”86  The Seventh Circuit seems to have invented this “essence 
test” for its fixation inquiry, having provided no citation for this standard.  
The parameters for the essence test are unclear, however, and offer little 
guidance for future cases involving visual arts. 
 
 77. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 292–93. 
 80. Id. at 293. 
 81. Id. at 294–95. 
 82. Id. at 303. 
 83. Id. at 304. 
 84. Id. at 305. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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E.  Lessons for Copyright 
What lessons do we learn from looking at the above examples of 
contemporary art?  First, we learn that this sort of art is not marginal but 
instead represents a dominant current in contemporary art, recognized by 
artists and consumers of art, judges of the Turner Prize and the MacArthur 
grants, as well as renowned art museums worldwide, such as the MoMA, 
the Whitney, and the Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art.  This is 
not some trifling around at the fringes but instead a movement at the heart 
of contemporary creativity.  The renown of the artists and movements 
involved in particular demonstrate that U.S. copyright law is moving further 
and further from its core function by requiring that works not contain 
transitory elements to establish basic copyrightability.  Fine art surely 
comes within the core of that which copyright is meant to encourage, and 
yet entire schools of art, including some of the most acclaimed 
contemporary artists of our time, cannot qualify for copyright protection 
(while works such as this paragraph do). 
While the focus of our research has been on recent art, lions of twentieth 
century art, such as Robert Rauschenberg and Wilhelm de Kooning, also 
exhibited a broad conception of art that countenanced works with transitory 
elements.  Famously, Rauschenberg asked De Kooning for a drawing and 
upon receiving it, began slowly erasing it over a period of weeks.87  The act 
of erasing constituted the work.88  The fact of their participation in this 
manner makes the claim that works of transitory duration are not artistically 
significant even more implausible.  Moreover, even if such works were not 
important art, under the Bleistein principle, copyright should be equally 
interested in protecting them. 
The “transitory duration” requirement for fixation means that these sorts 
of works per se will simply not receive copyright protection, while works 
that do not have dynamic features will. The fixation requirement in its 
current state thus serves a pernicious function.  Other things being equal, an 
initial policy prescription appears obvious:  abolish the fixation requirement 
so copyright law better protects new, unfixed forms of art.  As mentioned in 
the Introduction, the obvious question raised by this prescription is why 
copyright requires fixation. 
 
 
 87. MARK STEVENS & ANNALYN SWAN, DE KOONING:  AN AMERICAN MASTER 359 
(2004) (“Rauchenberg . . . asked [De Kooning] if he might have a drawing.  That in itself 
was not unusual . . . .  But Rauschenberg wanted the drawing not to hang in his studio, but to 
erase . . . .  [De Kooning] told Rauschenberg:  ‘I know what you’re doing.’ . . .  The young 
artist was engaged in a symbolic act of generational and Oedipal murder, at once comic and 
deadly serious.  He was ridding himself of a burdensome father.  He was doing so, moreover, 
in the joking language of Dada, a movement that did not respect the sanctity of the art object 
or celebrate the romantic passion of de Kooning’s generation.”). 
 88. Id. 
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II.  PURPOSES OF THE FIXATION REQUIREMENT 
In this Part, we examine the origins of the fixation requirement and the 
rationales supporting it.  Common justifications for the fixation requirement 
include claims that fixation is a constitutional requirement, as well as the 
use of fixation as a check on the capaciousness of the originality 
requirement, and fixation as an evidentiary tool.  We conclude that the 
proper function of fixation will be equally supported, and the purposes of 
copyright more effectively served, if the “transitory duration” language is 
stricken from the statute. 
A.  Fixation As a Constitutional Requirement 
Numerous courts and commentators have seen fixation as a constitutional 
requirement, based on the language in Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution, which allows Congress to provide copyright for writings of 
authors.89  Many have argued that the notion of a “writing” necessarily 
implies a work that is “fixed.”90  While the presence of a fixation 
requirement is often assumed, fixation de jure did not exist prior to the 1976 
Act.91  In other words, the U.S. copyright system functioned without the 
fixation requirement for nearly the first two centuries of its existence.  From 
the first U.S. Copyright Act of 1790 through amendments to the 1909 Act, 
fixation was, however, a de facto, if not incidental, aspect of copyright law, 
through both subject matter and formality requirements.92  In 1790, the only 
works that were protected under the Copyright Act were maps, charts, and 
books, all of which were fixed automatically upon creation due to the nature 
of the works.93  The 1909 Act broadened copyrightable works to include 
“all the writings of an author.”94  At that time, fixation per se was not an 
issue because federal copyright protection itself required acts that involved 
embodying the work in some kind of physical form.95  For example, 
copyright protection hinged upon publication with the required notice of 
copyright affixed to the work and the deposit of a copy of the work with the 
Copyright Office.96  The requirement to publish and submit a physical copy 
de facto required fixation. 
 
 89. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 90. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303 (“‘Without fixation,’ moreover, ‘there cannot be a writing.’” 
(emphasis added) (quoting 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 3:22 
(1994))); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03B (2013) 
(stating that unless a work is reduced to tangible form, it cannot be considered a writing). 
 91. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 
(including no fixation language); Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (same). 
 92. See, e.g., Washingtonian Publ’g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 46 (1939) (discussing 
deposit formality before and after 1890 Copyright Act revisions); Laura A. Heymann, How 
To Write a Life:  Some Thoughts on Fixation and the Copyright/Privacy Divide, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 825, 844 (2009). 
 93. See Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. at 125. 
 94. Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. at 1076; Heymann, supra note 92, at 844. 
 95. Heymann, supra note 92, at 844. 
 96. Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. at 1076.  Copyright could be secured for work not 
reproduced in copies for sale by deposit of an identifying reproduction of the work with the 
Copyright Office. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW 
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Discussions surrounding the fixation requirement first appeared in 
legislative debate on amendments to the Copyright Act of 1909, although 
no subsequent proposals were adopted.97  Proposed revisions suggested 
removing the de facto fixation requirement for copyright registration (and 
thus copyrightability), because the intended subject of protection was the 
intellectual production of authors, whether or not that creative output was in 
some concrete form.98  During the seventy-first Congress, the House of 
Representatives considered a proposal to provide copyright protection to an 
author’s work “in any medium or form or by any method through which the 
thought of the author may be expressed.”99  Again during the seventy-
fourth Congress, the House of Representatives considered a proposal to 
amend section 4 of the Copyright Act of 1909 to provide for copyright 
protection for “all the writings of an author, whatever the mode or form of 
their expression, and all renditions and interpretations of a performer and/or 
interpreter of any musical, literary, dramatic work, or other composition, 
whatever the mode or form of such renditions, performances, or 
interpretations.”100 
By 1965, revision bills were introduced in Congress that proposed 
fixation language, recommending that “the present implicit requirement of 
fixation . . . be made explicit in the bill, and that it be stated broadly enough 
to cover ‘any new forms or media [of fixation] that may be developed.’”101  
This idea took root in the text of the Copyright Act of 1976, which sought 
to expand copyright protection to a larger class of works not previously 
covered under copyright law.102  The fixation requirement was viewed by 
Congress as one way of accomplishing this goal; Congress sought to 
characterize fixation in “broad language” to eliminate “artificial and largely 
unjustifiable distinctions” drawn between various works by case law under 
the prior Act.103  Thus, replacing the publication requirement with a 
fixation requirement enabled federal copyright law to reach a new class of 
artistic works for the first time. 
A catalyst for this change came, in part, from the Supreme Court’s 
holding in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.104  There, the 
Court held that player piano rolls, readable only by machine, were not 
copies for the purposes of the Copyright Act, which at that time required a 
 
REVISION:  STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY:  STUDY NO. 28 COPYRIGHT IN 
CHOREOGRAPHIC WORKS 96 (Comm. Print 1961) (including a study by Borge Varmer). 
 97. See Heymann, supra note 92, at 846 (citing S. 3008, 88th Cong. (1964) (introduced 
by Sen. John McClellan); H.R. 11947, 88th Cong. (1964) (introduced by Rep. Emanuel 
Celler); H.R. 12354, 88th Cong. (1964) (introduced by Rep. William St. Onge)). 
 98. Id. at 844 (citing H.R. 6990, 71st Cong. § 1 (1930)). 
 99. H.R. 6990, 71st Cong. § 1. 
 100. H.R. 10632, 74th Cong. (1936). 
 101. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., SUPPLEMENTARY REP. OF THE 
REG. OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW:  1965 
REVISION BILL, pt. 6, at 4 (Comm. Print 1965) (second alteration in original). 
 102. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51–52. 
 103. See id. at 52. 
 104. 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
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copy to be “in intelligible notation.”105  To address this problem, Congress 
created a compulsory licensing scheme to compensate artists who 
previously received no compensation for such mechanical reproductions.106  
But the seed had been planted, and the 1976 House Report explained that 
with the Copyright Act of 1976, “Congress did away altogether with the 
‘artificial and largely unjustifiable distinction[]’ that made copyright 
protection dependent upon the form of fixation.”107  That this was part of 
the justification of the fixation requirement is ironic.  Due to changes in the 
world—the emergence of contemporary art and digital media that result in a 
proliferation of works of “transitory duration,” in particular—the fixation 
requirement now causes the precise result it was meant to remedy, namely, 
drawing an “artificial and largely unjustifiable distinction” that serves to 
preclude certain categories of works from copyright protection. 
B.  Statutory Fixation As a Check on the  
Capaciousness of the Originality Requirement 
Copyrightability has two basic requirements under U.S. law:  fixation 
and originality.  While originality may be the sine qua non of copyright 
law,108 the amount of originality or creativity required under U.S. law for 
purposes of satisfying the originality requirement has a famously low 
threshold.109  In a Berne Convention signatory country such as Switzerland, 
for example, if a person simply pulled out her phone and took an offhand 
snapshot of a random scene, this photograph would doubtfully qualify for 
copyright protection.110  In the United States, however, this photograph 
likely would qualify.111  Thus, the requirement gives a very wide berth to 
 
 105. Id. at 17. 
 106. See Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973). 
 107. Carrie Ryan Gallia, To Fix or Not To Fix:  Copyright’s Fixation Requirement and 
the Rights of Theatrical Collaborators, 92 MINN. L. REV. 231 (2007) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 
94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665) (alteration in original).  
Despite inclusion of a fixation requirement in the 1976 Act, the bill did not contain a 
definition of “fixation” and the broadcast industry raised concerns about its televised live 
events.  As a result, the current definition of “fixation” was added, including the provision 
that a transmission is considered “fixed” if “a fixation of the work is being made 
simultaneously with its transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 108. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“The sine qua 
non of copyright is originality.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (noting 
that photographs are sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection); Baker v. Selden, 
101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d 
Cir. 1951) (“[T]he standards for patents and copyrights are basically different.”). 
 110. See generally Lisa A. Zakolski, Protection Under Berne Convention, 18 AM. JUR. 2D 
Copyright and Literary Property § 202 (2011) (“The issue of the ownership of copyrights in 
works created by a country’s nationals and first published in that country will be determined 
under the law of that country, which is the works’ country of origin pursuant to the Berne 
Convention and which has the closest relationship to the works.”). 
 111. See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60 (“These findings, we think, show this photograph 
to be an original work of art, the product of plaintiff’s intellectual invention, of which 
plaintiff is the author, and of a class of inventions for which the constitution intended that 
congress should secure to him the exclusive right to use, publish and sell.”). 
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what can be copyrighted.  The fixation requirement cabins the writ of 
copyright, as a range of original works would be copyrightable but for the 
lack of fixation. 
Professor Douglas Lichtman has argued that “the real purpose of the 
fixation requirement is to narrow copyright’s purview.”112  In support of his 
argument, Lichtman cites Falwell v. Penthouse International, Ltd.,113 where 
the Western District of Virginia worried that including unfixed expression 
within the purview of copyright would protect “‘every utterance’” and 
“‘courts would be inundated’ with copyright claims.”114  An early leading 
case on precisely this issue is Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 
Inc.115  Ernest Hemingway’s estate sought an infringement judgment 
against A. E. Hotchner, Hemingway’s biographer, based on his writing 
down in the biography the contents of discussions he had with 
Hemingway.116  Hemingway’s estate claimed that there was a common law 
copyright in the words Hemingway uttered during his conversations with 
Hotchner.117  Although the New York Court of Appeals recognized that 
common law copyright protection for “certain limited kinds of spoken 
dialogue” may exist, the court declined to extend such protection to 
Hemingway’s conversation because he did not “mark off the utterance in 
question from the ordinary stream of speech.”118  The court’s remark 
implies three claims:  First, as far as originality is concerned, Hemingway’s 
ordinary stream of speech colorably contains sufficient originality for 
copyright protection.  Second, this is perniciously overbroad.  And third, a 
copyrightability requirement mandating that such content be “set off” as a 
work is thus desirable. 
C.  Statutory Fixation As Evidence 
Perhaps the most compelling argument for the fixation requirement is 
that fixation serves an important evidentiary purpose.  As one author has 
stated, “[O]ne of the most important reasons for requiring fixation . . . as a 
condition precedent to copyright protection is to ensure that a copyright 
claimant will be able to provide a court documentary evidence of the 
copyrightable subject matter.”119  Without fixation, “copyright law would 
forever be mired in disputes over the definition and boundaries of the works 
 
 112. Douglas Lichtman, Copyright As a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 722, 729 
(2003). 
 113. 521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981). 
 114. Lichtman, supra note 112, at 722 (quoting Falwell, 521 F. Supp. at 1207).  While the 
court in Falwell declined to extend copyright protection to the facts at bar, it noted that a 
“cause of action involving an [unfixed] oral expression can be sustained under a common 
law copyright theory” in narrow circumstances. Falwell, 521 F. Supp. at 1208. 
 115. 244 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 1968). 
 116. Id. at 252–53. 
 117. Id. at 253 (noting that Hotchner wrote the text down, though not with the explicit 
consent of the author). 
 118. Id. at 256. 
 119. VerSteeg, supra note 20, at 132. 
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claiming copyright protection.”120  Professor Laura Heymann has further 
suggested that fixed art provides a tangible form from which courts can 
assess the originality requirement:  “It is not enough for an author to 
describe his creative process . . . rather, a court must be able to compare 
what the putative author has created to what came before to determine if the 
‘modicum of creativity’ that the court has required exists.”121 
Copyright seeks to incentivize the creation of works in the public domain 
by granting artists exclusive rights for a limited time.  Justice Potter Stewart 
stated that “[t]he immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair 
return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this 
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”122  
Arguably, commoditizing the creative process so that creators have property 
rights in tangible goods (even if the works themselves are intangible) is 
easier; fixation helps to define the metes and bounds of a copyrighted 
work.123  Professor Wendy Gordon has stated that the fixation requirement 
serves as a tangible boundary to intellectual property, which allows others 
to interact appropriately with that property.124  She argues that if intellectual 
property is not given boundaries that define the scope and parameters of a 
work, and thus the demarcation between public and private property, fair 
use of such works will be chilled.125 
III.  FIXATION WILL SERVE ITS PURPOSES WITHOUT THE  
TRANSITORY DURATION LIMITATION 
What, then, is the response to these arguments in favor of the fixation 
requirement?  This Article does not argue that the fixation requirement is 
unnecessary for copyright law.  Ironically, the importance of the fixation 
requirement actually vitiates the need to exclude transitory works from 
copyrightability.  As a practical matter, most creators will embody their 
works in some form, whether or not doing so is required for 
copyrightability.  A primary reason for this is that fixation is an inherent 
aspect of many important categories of copyrightable works.  Another 
notable reason is that fixation often provides authors with a strategic 
advantage in commercializing their works and in the context of 
infringement suits. 
Embodiment in a form for more than a transitory duration—classic 
“fixation”—serves as a natural “end” to many works within the subject 
matter of copyright, such as films, books, photos, music, software and 
more.  Along the idea-expression spectrum, fixation for many categories of 
 
 120. Gregory S. Donat, Fixing Fixation:  A Copyright with Teeth for Improvisational 
Performers, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1400 (1997) (“[M]ore precise limitations on ‘writings’ 
might be convenient.” (quoting CBS, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 1967)). 
 121. Heymann, supra note 92, at 853. 
 122. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
 123. See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright:  The Challenges of 
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1383 (1989). 
 124. See id. at 1383–84. 
 125. Id. at 1379–80, 1383. 
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protectable works is the final step across the threshold of expression.  
Perhaps the most obvious examples are paintings.  An oil painting does not 
exist until an artist puts it down on canvas.  The idea for the painting may 
exist in the artist’s head prior to the existence of the painting, but the 
expression of the painting is the painting.126  The expression is the physical 
object that can be viewed, appreciated, and sold.  Likewise, books cannot be 
read and films cannot be viewed until they are fixed.  Indeed, paintings are 
not paintings, books are not books, and films are not films until they are 
fixed in a way that comports with the statutory requirements. 
Note, by contrast, one of Andy Goldworthy’s works described previously 
that does exist apart from being put down on canvas, so to speak.  Unlike a 
DVD of a commercial film—which Goldsworthy has made, as well127—the 
video is not an instantiation of the work itself.  The work itself is “fixed” in 
exactly the way it is supposed to be for the art itself—using natural 
materials that change over time—but that method of fixation does not 
satisfy the terms of the statute, because it is of “transitory duration.”  
Marina Abramović’s performance art pieces are fixed precisely in the way 
they are supposed to be fixed—so precisely, in fact, that she can train others 
to perform them for a retrospective at one of the most preeminent modern 
art museums in the world.  But they are not fixed according to the terms of 
section 101 of the Copyright Act because they are of “transitory duration.” 
Statutory fixation for many works provides a commercial advantage.  
Works that have been embodied in tangible copies are easier to 
commoditize (and distribute).  When a copyrightable work becomes fixed 
for more than a transitory duration, it becomes an object ready to be sold, 
licensed, or consumed in the stream of commerce.  If tangible evidence is 
preserved, proving infringement is also much easier.  These assertions 
suggest that in most instances, creators, particularly commercial creators, 
need no additional incentive to fix their works above and beyond the 
reasons pertaining to how such types of works are created and channeled 
into commercial markets. 
A.  The Constitutional Language Cannot Be Fairly Interpreted To Require 
Fixation for More Than a Transitory Duration 
Contemplate the pertinence of these considerations to the first rationale 
set forth above that the requirements for fixation are based on the 
constitutional requirement of a writing.  There is a surprising dearth of 
discussion related to the constitutional definition of “writings” and how 
courts interpret this requirement under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8.128  It 
has been suggested that “works of authorship” should extend to the full 
 
 126. Which is not to say that the painting, qua physical object, is the work either.  The 
work, per se, is the intangible creative element captured in pigment, linseed oil, and 
turpentine on canvas. 
 127. RIVERS AND TIDES:  WORKING WITH TIME, supra note 36. 
 128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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constitutional boundaries of the term “writings,”129 but what those 
boundaries would be is unclear. 
Legislative history indicates that the phrase “works of authorship” is 
“purposely left undefined.”130  Congress intended to create a flexible 
definition result that would neither “freeze the scope of copyrightable 
technology [n]or . . . allow unlimited expansion into areas completely 
outside the present congressional intent.”131  Again, no clear explanation 
exists as to what is “completely outside the present congressional intent.”132 
Taking a markedly different approach than the spirit of this legislative 
history would indicate, the Kelley court ruled that Wildflower Works did 
satisfy “originality” but did not satisfy the “authorship” requirement of 
copyright law.133  It found that Wildflower Works “plainly possesse[d] more 
than a little creative spark,” so it met the threshold for originality.134  It 
even clarified that “[n]o one argues that Wildflower Works was copied,” 
and “an author’s expressive combination or arrangement of otherwise 
noncopyrightable elements . . . may satisfy the originality requirement.”135  
Although the court determined that Kelley did not copy the work and that 
an author’s combination of elements was original, it still held that 
Wildflower Works lacked authorship.136  As such, the court’s holding and 
reasoning are simply not consistent.  How the court could find creativity 
without an author remains unclear. 
The Kelley court elaborated that even though Wildflower Works was 
expertly designed and planted with great thought, gardens could not be 
authored because most of the form and appearance are due to natural 
forces.137  The court explained that most of what we experience in a garden 
is created by nature, rather than by a gardener: 
Of course, a human “author”—whether an artist, a professional landscape 
designer, or an amateur backyard gardener—determines the initial 
arrangement of the plants in a garden. This is not the kind of authorship 
required for copyright. To the extent that seeds or seedlings can be 
considered a “medium of expression,” they originate in nature, and 
 
 129. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).  Some tangible embodiment has been 
implicitly recognized as important since the beginning of U.S. copyright law.  Supreme 
Court opinions and congressional practice have seemingly interpreted the constitutional 
word “writings” to necessitate a physical manifestation. Brian Danitz, Comment, 
Martingnon and KISS Catalog:  Can Live Performances Be Protected? 15 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1159–60 (2005) (citing 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 90, 
§ 1.08[C][2]).  A debate exists as to whether it is a constitutional requirement. Stefan 
Hubanov, The Multifaceted Nature and Problematic Status of Fixation in U.S. Copyright 
Law, 11 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 111, 113 (2006).  No Supreme Court decision has ever ruled 
that fixation is explicitly required by the Constitution, and legislative history is inconsistent 
on the issue. Id. at 113–14. 
 130. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (emphasis added). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 304. 
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natural forces—not the intellect of the gardener—determine their form, 
growth, and appearance.138 
The court also reasoned that authors of copyrighted works must be human, 
concluding that works reliant on natural elements for their form accordingly 
are not copyrightable.139 
One of the first cases to consider what constituted “writings” was 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.140  In that case, the Court noted 
that a “writing” could not be limited to the actual script of the author; 
rather, copyrightability must focus on the creative expression and output of 
the author, not the form of it.141  Thus, “writings” should “include all forms 
. . . by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible 
expression.”142  In light of copyright’s goals of encouraging intellectual 
creation, the First Circuit has stated that the constitutional protection 
“extends to any concrete, describable manifestation of intellectual creation,” 
and works will only be ineligible for protection where they are simply 
ineffable.143  More than a hundred years later, in Goldstein v. California,144 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed Burrow-Giles and noted that the “writings” 
requirement has not over time “been construed in [its] narrow literal sense, 
but, rather, with the reach necessary to reflect the broad scope of 
constitutional principles.”145  The Court went on to say that “although the 
word ‘writings’ might be limited to script or printed material, it may be 
interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative 
intellectual or aesthetic labor.”146  Thus, contrary to the facile claim often 
made that the constitutional requirement of a writing would mandate 
fixation, the opposite turns out to be true, namely, much interpretation and 
commentary on this requirement suggests that it is to be broadly interpreted 
to accommodate and encompass new forms of creative expression as they 
emerge. 
While the Supreme Court in this early case displayed the sort of broad, 
policy-oriented mode of analysis necessary to refashion the role of fixation 
in a changing world, Congress is arguably more wedded to the fundamental 
importance of a fixation requirement that excludes transitory works.  This is 
best seen in Congress’s approach to “bootlegging.”  Following the passage 
of the Sound Recording Act of 1971,147 a void of federal protection still 
remained for the live musical performances of artists.  One could 
surreptitiously record a copy of a performance and later sell it, a practice 
known as bootlegging.  Congress amended Title 17 of the U.S. Code by 
adding a § 1101, separate from the Copyright Act (which is codified in 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. (citing 2 PATRY, supra note 90, § 3:19 n.1). 
 140. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
 141. Id. at 58. 
 142. Id. 
 143. CBS, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 1967). 
 144. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
 145. Id. at 561. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. 
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Chapters 1 to 8 of Title 17), which provided for a new civil cause of action 
for unauthorized fixation of, or trafficking in, live musical performances.148  
Simultaneously, Congress also added a parallel criminal statute, codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 2319A.  Many commentators questioned whether a court would 
find such a law, which gave copyright-like protection to a statutorily 
unfixed work, was within the purview of the Constitutional requirement 
giving protection only to “writings.”149 
In United States v. Moghadam,150 the Eleventh Circuit rejected a 
constitutional challenge to the criminal statute.151  Defendant “Moghadam 
argue[d] that a live performance, by definition, ha[d] not been reduced to a 
tangible form or fixed as of the time of the performance” and thus did not 
qualify for federal protection.152 
While declining to decide whether the fixation concept would expand to 
encompass unrecorded live performances, the court went on to hold “that 
the Copyright Clause does not envision that Congress is positively 
forbidden from extending copyright-like protection under other 
constitutional clauses, such as the Commerce Clause, to works of 
authorship that may not meet the fixation requirement inherent in the term 
‘[w]ritings.’”153  This holding leaves the door open for Congress to legislate 
other copyright-like, quasi-copyright or sui generis protections for unfixed 
classes of work.  In dictum, the court expanded on quasi-copyright 
protection: 
Extending quasi-copyright protection to unfixed live musical 
performances . . . actually complements and is in harmony with the 
existing scheme that Congress has set up under the Copyright Clause. . . .  
Extending quasi-copyright protection also furthers the purpose of the 
Copyright Clause to promote the progress of the useful arts by securing 
some exclusive rights to the creative author. . . .  [A]lthough a live 
musical performance may not have been fixed, or reduced to tangible 
form, as of the time the bootleg copy was made, it certainly was subject to 
having been thus fixed.154 
While this statement is consistent with the current law that unfixed 
performances are ineligible for federal copyright protection, the language of 
the court clearly recognizes the value in transitory works and that the 
fixation requirement may not fully further the promotion of the arts as 
 
 148. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). 
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 151. Id. at 1281. 
 152. Id. at 1274. 
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intended.  In sum, the constitutional language cannot be fairly interpreted to 
exclude transitory works from copyright protection. 
B.  To Use Fixation As a Gatekeeper for Originality Is Inapt 
Now consider our response to the second argument, which suggests that 
the fixation requirement adds value by curbing the effects of an overly 
capacious originality standard.  This is a suboptimal means to deal with 
originality.  If the originality standard is too broad, it should be directly 
hemmed in to whatever degree is desirable.  Seeking to address the low 
originality threshold in the United States by means of fixation produces odd 
results.  For example, copyright protects billions of emails sent every day, 
despite the fact that such protection is not necessary to achieve the goals of 
copyright.  The fixation happens as a byproduct of the fact that online 
speech of this sort is fixed on computer servers simply due to how such 
machines function, not because authors are encouraged to engage in 
fixation due to the prospect of commercial gain.  The court in Hemingway 
worried that extending copyright protection to all speech would be too 
capacious.155  But this is precisely the result in a world of ubiquitous text 
messages and email.  Meanwhile, the works of an important contemporary 
artist such as Andy Goldsworthy go unprotected unless artificially fixed by 
proxy.  Clearly this odd and dysfunctional juxtaposition represents the 
unintended results of old rules applied in a new context.  The new context is 
one in which people write brief but fixed messages by the billions without 
the goal of promoting the arts and sciences, while contemporary artists like 
Goldsworthy do seek to add to the world of original art, and do so very 
successfully, but in a manner that leaves their works unfixed (at least as the 
term is currently understood).  Abolishing the fixation requirement 
alleviates this odd juxtaposition in which Goldsworthy’s work is not 
encouraged by copyright but random emails are. 
One may counter this by arguing that abolishing the fixation requirement 
solves the problem of underinclusion, but it worsens the problem of 
overinclusion since more works would now be copyrightable.  But the 
originality threshold is a substantive culprit in both under- and 
overinclusion.156  To use fixation as a gatekeeper for originality is inapt, 
 
 155. See Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 268 N.Y.S.2d 531, 537 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1966) (“Conversation cannot be catalogued as merely the cumulative product of separate 
and unrelated individual efforts, but, on the contrary, it is rather a synthesized whole that is 
indivisibly welded by the interaction of the parties involved. . . .  In light of the interaction 
which renders conversation indivisible, it is difficult to see how conversation can be held to 
constitute the sort of individual intellectual production to which protection is afforded by 
way of a common law copyright.”). 
 156. There are significant problems with the overinclusiveness of the originality 
requirement as we have noted here, but the originality requirement ironically is 
underinclusive, as well.  While it includes within the parameters of copyrightability 
countless emails and the Yellow Pages, courts have used the originality requirement to 
exclude forms of realistic art, such as the hand-blown, glass-in-glass jellyfish sculptures at 
issue in Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811–12 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The selection of the clear 
glass, oblong shroud, bright colors, proportion, vertical orientation, and stereotyped jellyfish 
form, considered together, lacks the quantum of originality needed to merit copyright 
2246 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
because there are fixed works that have a very low level of originality and 
unfixed works that have a very high level of originality.  No rational or 
proportional relationship exists between fixation and originality.  Important 
contemporary art that is unfixed simply makes this point in the extreme 
because such work is at the cutting edge of creativity, as recognized 
objectively by the art world establishment.157 
C.  Evidentiary Hurdles Provide No Reason To Disallow  
Copyright Protection for Transitory Works 
The evidentiary rationale for the fixation requirement posits that when a 
work exists in a tangible, stable physical form, it makes evidentiary issues, 
such as who owns a work and what precisely is the owned work, more 
tractable.  Two strong arguments demonstrate that the evidentiary 
justification is not persuasive.  First, the degradation of the copyright does 
not parallel the degradation of the work itself, provided the work was fixed 
at one point for “more than a transitory duration.”  Postcreation destruction 
of an originally fixed work does not affect the status of the underlying 
copyright in the work.  In fact, there is no requirement that the first fixation 
of the work (the “original”) exist in any form at the time of the infringement 
or the litigation.158  Professor Lichtman has stated:  “There is barely any 
difference between a case where there was never any fixation at all, and a 
case where there was a fixation that was destroyed before the relevant 
litigation commenced.  Yet that is exactly the line drawn by the modern 
fixation requirement.”159 
Second, the fact that unfixed works can be infringed upon also refutes 
copyright exclusion for transitory works.  To the contrary, only the 
reproduction right requires the defendant’s activity to consist of 
unauthorized “copies or phonorecords”; the derivative work and public 
performance rights contain no such requirement.160  The House Report 
accompanying the 1976 copyright revision expressly states: 
The exclusive right to prepare derivative works . . . overlaps the exclusive 
right of reproduction to some extent.  It is broader than that right, 
however, in the sense that reproduction requires fixation in copies . . . 
whereas the preparation of a derivative work, such as a ballet, pantomime, 
 
protection.”).  Other forms of contemporary art that have their place well within the structure 
of galleries and museums may also be excluded from the shelter of copyright law because of 
the inadequacy of the originality requirement.  Found art, a movement that began with 
Duchamp’s readymades and derives meaning from the artist’s intention and context, is one 
example.  While a thorough explication of the meaning of originality in copyright law is 
outside the scope of this Article, our argument is merely that to the extent there are issues 
with originality, we should address them on those terms rather than using the fixation 
requirement as a quick “fix,” if you will. 
 157. See supra Part I. 
 158. See Heymann, supra note 92, at 854. 
 159. Lichtman, supra note 112, at 732–33. 
 160. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
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or improvised performance, may be an infringement even though nothing 
is ever fixed in tangible form.161 
Thus, a transitory dramatic interpretation of a novel may infringe the 
derivative work right or the performance right without infringing the 
reproduction right.162  What are these infringements if not works of 
infringement? 
To see another instance of the purported evidentiary value of fixation at 
work, let us shift from high art to low art:  consider a relatively typical 
infringement case such as Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol 
Publishing Group, Inc.163  The plaintiff in this case made very specific 
claims regarding the defendant’s acts of putative infringement, including 
that the defendant took a certain number of lines of dialogue from episodes 
of Seinfeld.164  Now imagine a world in which there was no copy of the 
plaintiff’s work to compare to the defendant’s putatively infringing book.  
Suppose, for example, that the plaintiff had never filmed the television 
episodes but instead had performed them live and had not fixed them via a 
script or a video.  As an evidentiary matter, the plaintiff would have a 
harder time making out its factual allegations regarding access and 
substantial similarity.  For instance, the plaintiff might have to rely on 
testimony of the performers or of the audience regarding claims such as 
which lines were uttered by the plaintiff’s troupe.165 
Two points are important to note here.  First, the plaintiff would have a 
harder time meeting the evidentiary burden of establishing an unauthorized 
taking by the defendant than she would if the work were fixed.  Indeed, the 
burden would seem doubly difficult if both the plaintiff’s work and the 
defendant’s work were transitory.  This might occur if, for example, the 
 
 161. Tyler T. Ochoa, Symposium Review:  Copyright, Derivative Works and Fixation:  Is 
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(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5657, 5675); see also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. 
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that the definition of a 
derivative work does not require fixation). 
 162. H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 53 (1966) (“[R]eproduction requires fixation in copies or 
phonorecords, whereas the preparation of a derivative work, such as a ballet, pantomime, or 
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 163. 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming the ruling of then Southern District of New 
York Judge Sonia Sotomayor that a game that tested players’ knowledge of lines of 
dialogue, characters, and plot elements from Seinfeld without the permission of the show’s 
producers was an act of copyright infringement that did not fall under the fair use exception). 
 164. See id. at 138 (“By copying not a few but 643 fragments from the Seinfeld television 
series, however, The SAT has plainly crossed the quantitative copying threshold under 
Ringgold.”). 
 165. Relatedly, the archival rationale focuses on how fixation furthers the goal of 
preserving expression.  Lichtman, supra note 112, at 723.  The claim is that because fixation 
is durable and transferable, it increases the likelihood that the work will be passed from place 
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through other means, and fixation does not necessarily maintain the expression for a lengthy 
period of time since it does not demand permanence. Id.  Moreover, as argued above, even 
without an explicit fixation requirement, there is a strong incentive to fix. 
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defendant had instead engaged in a live performance based on the plaintiff’s 
live performance instead of creating a book using Seinfeld material. 
While such a situation might indeed present evidentiary problems for the 
plaintiff’s case, it is the exception that proves the rule.  This scenario is 
unlikely to occur because, in the normal course of their creative endeavors, 
plaintiffs and defendants of this sort will have reason to fix their works, 
regardless of whether fixation is a requirement for copyright protection.  
Doing so is a strategic business choice. 
Thus, there will be less physical evidence for courts to consider in cases 
involving transitory works.  Evidentiary problems in litigation serve as a 
caution to keep good records.  However, these evidentiary hurdles are no 
reason to disallow copyright protection.  By analogy, if a crime occurs with 
little evidence, a court would not deal with this shortcoming by denying that 
a crime took place. 
Fixation does serve an important evidentiary purpose, however, insofar 
as it provides a method of discerning the parameters of a work.  The 
fixation requirement helps delineate an idea from its expression.  For this 
reason, we do not advocate eliminating the fixation requirement entirely, 
but merely removing the “transitory duration” exclusion from the statute.  
Removing the transitory duration exclusion would enable the fixation 
requirement to separate idea from expression, but still extend copyright 
protection to a class of works containing transitory elements.  If the 
transitory duration exclusion is removed, the parameters of a work would 
be defined according to its “embodiment,” which “is sufficiently permanent 
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated.”166  A fixation of a work in this context would be consistent 
with the Burrow-Giles Court’s call for a “physical rendering” of some sort.  
This term would appear applicable to, for instance, one of Andy 
Goldsworthy’s works; we recast this as a requirement for “perception” or 
“communication.”  Congress could adopt a policy similar to France,167 
Germany, Spain,168 Switzerland,169 the Netherlands, and other countries 
where copyright protection is granted once the work is in a form that others 
can perceive.170  A perception requirement would be a logical alternative 
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because the copyright statute mentions works that can be “perceived” when 
delineating the boundaries of copyrightable subject matter.171 
D.  Excluding Transitory Works from Copyrightability Fosters 
Inconsistency in U.S. Copyright Policy 
In addition, the present situation raises a fundamental problem for U.S. 
copyright policy.  Why should authors working in media that is unfixed by 
copyright standards be better treated abroad than they are in the United 
States?  For decades, the United States has been a mecca of artistic works.  
Incentivizing contemporary creators to work outside the United States 
contradicts Congress’s goal to promote the arts and sciences by means of 
the exclusive and limited rights afforded by copyright protection.  Many 
countries have copyright regimes that do not require fixation.172  
Furthermore, no U.S. international treaty requires fixation for copyright 
protection.173  The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 
recommended fixation but did not require it.174  If exclusion for transitory 
works is not considered crucial enough to be included in such international 
agreements, U.S. copyright should not require it either. 
Indeed the same is true for individual U.S. states that do not always 
require fixation for state copyright protection.  Some states, such as 
California, have enacted state copyright statutes that protect works that are 
either not fixed in a tangible medium or works that are fixed for merely a 
transitory duration.175  Other states, including Montana, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota, have similar statutes that protect unfixed “products of the 
mind.”176  Legislation under these statutes is limited, but lends support for 
 
 171. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  Copyright protection is granted to “original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they 
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.” Id. 
 172. Civil law countries often grant copyright protection to a work once it is in a form in 
which others can perceive it, regardless of whether it is also fixed. GOLDSTEIN & 
HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 170, at 229.  Additionally, Article 2(2) of the Berne Convention 
leaves it to the different member countries to determine whether fixation in some form is 
required for copyright protection. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works art. 2(2), Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 
(amended Sept. 28, 1979) [hereinafter Berne Convention].  Berne Convention Article 2(1) 
states:  “The expression ‘literary and artistic works’ shall include every production in the 
literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, 
such as . . . three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or 
science.” Id. art. 2(1) (emphasis added).  It also states, “It shall, however, be a matter for 
legislation in the countries of the Union to prescribe that works in general or any specified 
categories of works shall not be protected unless they have been fixed in some material 
form.” Id. art. 2(2). 
 173. Hubanov, supra note 129, at 115. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(1) (West 1982). 
 176. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-131 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-07-04 (2011); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 43-43-1 (2012).  All three statutes are nearly identical; the North Dakota 
statute reads: 
The author of any product of the mind, whether it is an invention, a composition in 
letters or art, a design, with or without delineation or other graphical 
representation, has an exclusive ownership therein and in the representation or 
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the proposition that a copyright system can function while including 
transitory works.  The California statute reads: 
The author of any original work of authorship that is not fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression has an exclusive ownership in the 
representation or expression thereof as against all persons except one who 
originally and independently creates the same or similar work. A work 
shall be considered not fixed when it is not embodied in a tangible 
medium of expression or when its embodiment in a tangible medium of 
expression is not sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more 
than transitory duration, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.177 
The California legislature drafted the statute in its present form to avoid 
preemption problems by clearly indicating that California common law 
copyright protects works that fall outside of the scope of federal copyright 
law.178 
It seems the types of works brought in to copyright protection 
under this statute are either extemporaneous—or semi-extemporaneous—
performances, or works not yet in their final form.  A California appellate 
court held, for example, that academic lectures are protectable as unfixed 
works under California common law copyright.179  The court briefly 
contemplated the challenges of determining unfixed works boundaries.180  
Referring to the nature of professors to build and develop their lectures over 
time while working for different institutions, the court commented that if 
the common law copyright in the plaintiff’s unfixed lectures had to be split 
up, it would be nearly impossible to distinguish which parts of the 
plaintiff’s lectures were created during the plaintiff’s employment at UCLA 
and what parts were created at another time.181 
Another type of performance protected by the California statute is a radio 
program broadcast but not simultaneously recorded.  In Trenton v. Infinity 
Broadcasting Corp.,182 a radio show creator and host argued that his on-air 
performances were an unfixed work.183  The court disagreed, finding that 
the radio station did record the performances for a sufficient time to create a 
fixation under federal copyright law.  But, the court said that if the plaintiff 
could show certain individual programs were not recorded while broadcast 
they would fall within the California unfixed works statute.184  An 
unpublished and unperformed play was not fixed to qualify for federal 
 
expression thereof which continues as long as the product and the representations 
or expressions thereof made by the author remain in the author’s possession. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-07-04. 
 177. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(1). 
 178. Lukens v. Broder/Kurland Agency, No. CV 00–08359 NM (JWJx), 2000 WL 
35892340 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2000). 
 179. Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 545 (Ct. App. 1969). 
 180. Id. at 546–47. 
 181. Id. at 546. 
 182. 865 F. Supp. 1416 (C.D. Cal. 1994). 
 183. Id. at 1423–24. 
 184. Id. at 1425. 
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copyright protection, but did qualify as an unfixed work under California 
law.  In a plagiarism suit under section 980, the court ultimately found no 
substantial similarity between the play and the allegedly infringing 
television show.185 
The existence of such state statutes proves that a copyright system 
without an exclusion for transitory works is feasible, even in the United 
States.  The fixation language used is consistent with federal law, so a 
similar policy retaining the fixation requirement but extending protection to 
transitory works seems reasonable.  Moreover, section 301(b) of the 
Copyright Act refuses to preempt state law that may protect an unfixed 
work.186  Thus, works that are of transitory duration have been given some 
limited rights in the U.S. system.187  Clearly, providing federal copyright 
protection to the same works would be compatible with both the purposes 
and the functioning of U.S. copyright law. 
As the conventional understanding goes, the 1976 Act contained 
fundamental changes in order to comply with obligations under the Berne 
Convention.188  The most important conceptual change in the 1976 Act was 
to move away from a formalistic system.  It has long been a core feature of 
the Berne Convention that due to copyright’s nature as a basic right of 
artists, copyrightability cannot be made susceptible to formalities, because 
the existence of formalities inevitably results in authors’ inability to secure 
copyright due to a failure of some formal act or requirement.189  
Accordingly, the 1976 Act brought big changes toward this end, including 
doing away with the previous formalities necessary to gain copyright 
protection, such as the registration and publication requirements 
altogether.190  Designed in part to eliminate formalities, the 1976 Act 
ironically first introduced a statutory fixation requirement.191  Because of 
its emphasis on form over function in excluding works that contain dynamic 
elements, the fixation requirement has become one of the most significant 
 
 185. Ware v. CBS, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 590, 594 (Ct. App. 1967).  The court applied an 
earlier version of the California statute, which at the time stated, “The author or proprietor of 
any composition in letters or art has an exclusive ownership in the representation or 
expression thereof as against all persons except one who originally and independently 
creates the same or a similar composition.” Id. at 592–93. 
 186. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) (2012) (“Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or 
remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to (1) subject matter 
that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 
103, including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”). 
 187. For the two cases Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341 (N.Y. 
1968), and Falwell v. Penthouse, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981), there were rights 
of publicity statutes on point, but no state copyright statutes. 
 188. See Ancel W. Lewis, Jr., Bruce E. Hayden & Sandeep Seth, Recent Developments in 
Copyright Law:  The Berne Convention, 22 COLO. LAW. 2525, 2525 (1993). 
 189. See Universal Copyright Convention art. III, para. 1, done July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 
1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 (entered into force July 10, 1974) (“Any Contracting State which, 
under its domestic law, requires as a condition of copyright, compliance with formalities . . . 
shall regard these requirements as satisfied with respect to all works protected in accordance 
with this Convention.”). 
 190. Note, An Author’s Artistic Reputation Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 92 HARV. L. 
REV. 1490, 1501–02 (1979). 
 191. See id. at 1495. 
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formalities ever codified in U.S. copyright law.  As has been discussed, 
fixation is ultimately justified on a variety of practical grounds, and it is 
precisely these sorts of rationales that the Berne Convention sought to 
diminish in importance. 
Considering all of the above factors, the rationales for fixation do not 
amount to anything approaching a sufficient reason to deny the protections 
of copyright to important categories of creative works. 
IV.  CASE LAW DEMONSTRATES THAT THE  
TRANSITORY DURATION LIMITATION IS OUTDATED 
The doctrine of fixation is becoming more complex and uncertain as 
events in the real world overtake the law’s ability to adapt.  A few recent 
cases illustrate this rapidly increasing complexity.  Fixation, which has 
historically been a relatively uncontroversial doctrine in copyright law, has 
moved front and center with developments in technology and the arts.  As 
media for creative expression have evolved, courts have wrestled with the 
parameters of fixation—specifically, what it means for a work to be fixed 
for “more than a transitory duration.”  Cases in the areas of digital media, 
performances, and conceptual art have all recently challenged the meaning 
of “transitory duration.”  These cases demonstrate that the transitory 
duration limitation on fixation is increasingly outdated. 
A.  The Transitory Duration Standard Is Unworkable for  
Digital Technologies 
As computer technology has become faster and more ubiquitous, the 
copyright exclusion for transitory works has come into question.  Perhaps 
the most notorious case to consider the duration needed for fixation has 
been MAI Systems Corporation v. Peak Computer, Inc.,192 which 
crystallized the fixation problem when considering “copies” in terms of a 
copyright infringement action.193  The Ninth Circuit agreed with MAI’s 
claims that maintenance by Peak was an infringing use of MAI’s protected 
software.194  Because the software was loaded into memory, and a 
technician could then view the error log and diagnose the problem, the court 
held that the representation created in the RAM satisfied the fixation 
requirement.195  The court noted that the Copyright Act requires 
embodiment, “in a copy . . . by or under the authority of the author,” and 
stability, “sufficiently permanent . . . to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration.”196  Relying on language from Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula 
International, Inc.,197 the court held that the copy made in RAM was 
 
 192. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 193. Id. at 519. 
 194. Id. at 518. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)). 
 197. 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984).  The Ninth Circuit quoted the Apple Computer 
court in support of its view: 
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“fixed” under the Copyright Act.198  Building on Vault Corp. v. Quaid 
Software, Ltd.,199 the Ninth Circuit proposed that the act of loading 
software onto RAM creates a copy under copyright law.200 
More recently, the Second Circuit revisited the question of fixation as 
applied to RAM technology and provided some (slight) measure of clarity.  
In Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.201 (Cablevision II), the court 
considered whether, by buffering data in a remote server, Cablevision was 
reproducing someone else’s copyrighted work by making a copy.202  The 
Second Circuit in Cablevision II took a different approach from MAI 
Systems in determining a similar issue of electronic storage, reaching a 
different conclusion regarding infringement and the creation of copies.203  
The district court had agreed with the plaintiff’s reliance on MAI Systems, 
finding that the temporary buffering of bits of data from the live feed into a 
remote server (at the request of a customer wishing to record a program) at 
a rate of 1.2 seconds before automatically being erased was more than a 
transitory duration and that a fixed copy had been improperly obtained.204 
The Second Circuit recognized the lower court’s attempt to focus the 
issue using the two-step analysis from MAI Systems, but found that it had 
mistakenly limited the analysis primarily to the embodiment 
requirement.205  It distinguished the holding in MAI Systems, that loading 
did create a copy, by emphasizing the need to consider the durational aspect 
of fixation and that loading into RAM can create a fixed copy.206  
Reasoning from Advanced Computer Services,207 the court held that the 
works were not fixed in the buffers because they were not embodied in the 
buffers for more than a transitory duration of time—no more than 1.2 
seconds, in fact—before being automatically overwritten.208  The court 
 
RAM can be simply defined as a computer component in which data and computer 
programs can be temporarily recorded.  Thus, the purchaser of [software] desiring 
to utilize in his computer all of the programs on the diskette could arrange to copy 
[the software] into RAM.  This would be only a temporary fixation.  It is a 
property of RAM that when the computer is turned off, the copy of the program 
recorded in RAM is lost. 
MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 519 (quoting Apple Computer, 594 F. Supp. at 622). 
 198. MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 519. 
 199. 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The act of loading a program from a medium of 
storage into a computer’s memory creates a copy of the program.”). 
 200. MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 519. 
 201. 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 202. Id. at 125. 
 203. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 127–29; see Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. 
Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 2d 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 204. Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. at 621. 
 205. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 127 (“As a result of this error, once [the district court] 
determined that the buffer data was ‘clearly . . . capable of being reproduced,’ i.e., that the 
work was embodied in the buffer, the district court concluded that the work was therefore 
‘fixed’ in the buffer, and that a copy had thus been made.” (citing Cablevision I, 478 F. 
Supp. 2d at 621–22)). 
 206. Id. at 128. 
 207. Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 
(E.D. Va. 1994). 
 208. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 130. 
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declined, however, to offer the 1.2 second duration as a benchmark to 
measure the still amorphous “transitory duration” standard.209  While this 
new analysis of the fixation requirement seems at odds with the MAI 
Systems court’s holding, the Second Circuit determined that the MAI 
Systems line of cases concluded that a copy was fixed without addressing 
the duration requirement of the embodiment analysis.210  Thus, the court 
reasoned, MAI Systems did not hold that loading a program into a form of 
RAM always results in copying:  “Such a holding would read the ‘transitory 
duration’ language out of the definition.”211 
Although focusing more on liability of an ISP in an infringement action, 
the Fourth Circuit in CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.212 has come close 
to providing a test for transitory duration.  The court discussed the process 
of creating the copies at issue, noting that the larger infrastructure of the 
internet is designed as a conduit for data and within that automatic system 
ISPs passively store material.213  The court held that the process of 
transmission creates a temporary, automatic response and that those 
electronic copies made during the transmission were not “fixed,” because 
such copies were used to automatically transmit users’ material and they 
were not “of more than transitory duration.”  The court recognized that 
transitory duration had both a qualitative and quantitative characteristic that 
needed to be considered:  “It is quantitative insofar as it describes the period 
during which the function occurs, and it is qualitative in the sense that it 
describes the status of transition.”214 
A third case concerning digital fixation, Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc.,215 
held that even a descriptive fixation would suffice for copyright 
protection.216  The court stated that if something is “described in sufficient 
detail to enable the work to be performed from that description,”217 then it 
would be “fixed” for purposes of copyright law.  In that case, “descriptive 
fixation” was satisfied by the audiovisual display of the Duke Nukem game.  
The court relied on ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg218 and analogized the rigid, 
exact replication of the displayed information to transposing onto sheet 
music in order for a musician to be able to sufficiently perform the same 
composition.219  The court in Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin220 built on the 
 
 209. Id. at 129–30. 
 210. Id. at 128 (“The MAI Systems court referenced the ‘transitory duration’ language but 
did not discuss or analyze it.”). 
 211. Id. (“Accordingly, we construe MAI Systems and its progeny as holding that loading 
a program into a computer’s RAM can result in copying that program.”). 
 212. 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 213. Id. at 555 (“[Internet service providers], when passively storing material at the 
direction of users in order to make that material available to other users upon their request, 
do not ‘copy’ the material in direct violation of § 106 of the Copyright Act.”). 
 214. Id. at 551. 
 215. 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 216. Id. at 1111–12. 
 217. Id. (citing 1 PATRY, supra note 90, at 168). 
 218. 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that computer files on a CD are fixed in 
a tangible medium of expression). 
 219. Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1111–12. 
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premise of fixation being satisfied by an identical, repetitive sequence.  In 
that case, database query results were fixed based on the rationale that the 
output was repeatable when the input was identical.221 
These cases demonstrate the difficulty of applying the fixation 
requirement generally, and the transitory duration limitation in particular, to 
digital technologies.  From these cases, it is clear that there is a trend 
toward a more flexible judicial interpretation of what it means to be “fixed.”  
Nevertheless, it is also apparent that as technology continues to advance, 
the courts will continue to be faced with drawing increasingly precise 
distinctions between “fixed” and “unfixed” bytes of data.  The sense of 
permanence historically associated with fixation is inapt for many digital 
technologies, and the question moves away from whether or not the work is 
of transitory duration at all, toward a consideration of how much transitory 
duration is acceptable for copyrightability. 
B.  The Transitory Duration Limitation Has Artificially Excluded  
Live Performances from the Purview of Copyright  
Unless Fixed by Proxy 
Copyright law encompasses many kinds of live performances.222  These 
live performances easily satisfy the minimal level of creativity necessary for 
originality, but fixation has historically presented a stumbling block to 
copyright protection.  The medium of performance presents a problem that 
is not easily addressed by flexible interpretation of the statute; instead, 
courts rely on the second clause of the definition of “fixation”223 and let 
either the transmission and broadcast of an event serve as an alternate 
answer to the fixation problem, or force authors to fix their works by proxy. 
Further defining this alternative to fixation in developing the modern 
statute, live broadcasts are fixed “if the program content is transmitted live 
to the public while being recorded at the same time.”224  This “workaround” 
option of simultaneous transmission creates a legal fiction that (especially 
when considering infringement) “fixation occurs before the 
transmission.”225  The original work, however, never had any copyright 
protection because of the lack of fixation; an unknown recording of the 
original work therefore could not infringe the original unless a simultaneous 
recording is made under the authority of the author.226 
 
 220. 136 F. Supp. 2d 276, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 221. Id. 
 222. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(3)–(4) (2012). 
 223. Id. § 101 (“[A] work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being 
transmitted, is ‘fixed’ . . . if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its 
transmission.”). 
 224. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665. 
 225. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg LP, 808 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 226. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 90, § 2.03[B][2] n.33; see also Prod. Contractors, 
Inc. v. WGN Cont’l Broad. Co., 622 F. Supp. 1500, 1503 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that a 
Christmas parade itself was not copyrightable, and the transmission of the event by a rival 
network did not constitute infringement, but the rebroadcast of the simultaneous 
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With the addition of choreography and dramatic performance to the 1976 
Act as copyrightable subject matter, fixation’s emphasis on tangibility and 
permanence remains a problem in seeking protection for those types of 
works.  Because of the transitory duration limitation, fixation for 
choreography, for example, involves recording the work either as a separate 
audiovisual work,227 through photographs,228 or as a literary work in the 
form of notations.229  These options for a creator enable a fixation by proxy; 
the problem still exists that the actual performance remains unfixed, but the 
newly created “fixation” is eligible for protection.  The Second Circuit 
came close in Horgan v. MacMillan to recognizing this dichotomy between 
fixation and communication of the performance when responding to the 
defendant’s argument that no infringement occurred because a “central 
characteristic of choreography is movement.”230  The court held that the 
photographs of Balanchine’s ballet infringed:  “A snapshot of a single 
moment in a dance sequence may communicate a great deal,”231 and 
freezing the moment allowed for communication of the work into the public 
sphere. 
Choreography represents an internal copyright disagreement; the statute 
with its reliance on a exclusion for works of a transitory duration suggests 
that the work is only important insofar as it can be reproduced in the future, 
but the language of being “perceived . . . or communicated”232 suggests that 
a work is eligible for protection as long as some concept is expressed and 
communicated regardless of how long that communication persists.233 
C.  Courts Struggle When Applying the Transitory Duration  
Limitation to Contemporary Works of Art 
In examining conceptual and process-oriented art,234 courts are still 
fixated on the end-goal and the potential for a product to persist by 
 
transmission, shown on ABC, would be an infringement because that work was protected as 
both fixed and original). 
 227. Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary 
Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 632 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that dances are available for copyright 
if they satisfy fixation). 
 228. Horgan v. MacMillan, 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986) (concerning a dispute between 
the owner of a copyright in choreography and an alleged infringer that published a book 
containing photographs of the choreography). 
 229. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 90, § 2.07[C] (“The preferable forms were 
either the Laban system of notation or a motion picture of the dance.”). 
 230. Horgan, 789 F.2d at 161–62. 
 231. Id. at 163. 
 232. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 233. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION:  
STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY:  STUDY NO. 28 COPYRIGHT IN CHOREOGRAPHIC WORKS 
96 (Comm. Print 1961) (“[D]ance must convey a dramatic concept or idea” (emphasis 
added)). 
 234. Sol LeWitt, Paragraphs on Conceptual Art, ARTFORUM, Summer 1967, at 79, 80 
(“In conceptual art the idea or concept is the most important aspect of the work.  When an 
artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all of the planning and decisions are made 
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reproduction.  Courts wrestle with the transitory duration exclusion for 
creative works that emphasize process over product.  These creative works 
may sometimes be seen as an ongoing expression of the artist or a 
permanent expression of an idea—both of which traditionally resist 
protection.235  Two modern cases, Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary 
Art Foundation, Inc. v. Büchel236 from the First Circuit and Kelley v. 
Chicago Park District237 from the Seventh Circuit highlight not only the 
disagreement among courts’ approaches to the fixation requirement as 
applied to these forms of creative works, but also the internal disconnect in 
trying to show that these media of expression come within the purview of 
copyright law. 
In Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation, Inc., the 
First Circuit considered whether an unfinished and conceptual work—
Christoph Büchel’s large-scale installation Training Ground for Democracy 
for the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art (MassMoCA)—was 
copyrightable under the fixation requirement.238  The First Circuit adhered 
to precedent in concluding that the unfinished work fell within the scope of 
the Copyright Act.239  Although the court saw the narrowly defined VARA 
rights as just compensation for the artist, they ignored the fundamental 
disagreement about the work itself; for the artist the work of art exists as 
soon as it is expressed into an experience (for public viewing), but in the 
eyes of the law art is only recognized after the artist steps away from it.240 
The Seventh Circuit, however, in evaluating Chapman Kelley’s 
Wildflower Works project, focused on the transitory duration limitation in 
terms of copyrightability;241 its decision highlights an internal confusion 
with the comparison to artist Jeff Koons’s plant-based sculpture Puppy.  
While holding that a “work” should communicate the fact that humans 
actually produced it,242 the court stumbled in categorization of Kelley’s 
 
beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair.  The idea becomes a machine that 
makes the art.” (emphasis added)). 
 235. Lily Ericsson, Creative Quandary:  The State of Copyrightability for Organic Works 
of Art, 23 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 359, 378 (2013) (noting that the guarantee of 
copyright law is protection for the expression but not the idea); see also London-Sire 
Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 170–71 (D. Mass. 2008) (“The Copyright Act 
thus does not use materiality in its most obvious sense . . . .  [I]t refers to materiality as a 
medium in which a copyrighted work can be ‘fixed.’”); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and 
Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1195–96 (2007). 
 236. 593 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 237. 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 238. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc., 593 F.3d at 41–42; see also 
Michael J. Madison, The End of the Work As We Know It, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 342 
(2012) (“The law does not concern itself with trifles.  In a related sense, a creative thing may 
emerge as a work from early or preliminary effort, and in doing so it crosses a kind of 
copyright boundary.”). 
 239. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc., 593 F.3d at 51–52. 
 240. Cf. Madison, supra note 238, at 335 (suggesting that the fixation requirement is just 
an outgrowth of the pre-1976 requirement of publication for protection). 
 241. Id. at 350 (“The work is, fundamentally, something that we assume should remain 
the same . . . across artistic disciplines . . . .”). 
 242. Id. at 351. 
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artwork, which it called “infinitely malleable.”243 The court was skeptical 
that the plaintiff’s work could be treated as painting or sculpture244 and 
found that the fixation requirement precluded copyright protection for his 
work.  The “denial of copyright protection for works with an ‘essence’ of 
‘vitality’”245 rests on the interplay of fixation and medium of expression; 
fixation is defeated if the work is presented in a medium that is subject to 
change.246  But the court contradicted its ruling when comparing Kelley’s 
Wildflower Works installation to Koons’s Puppy, which it noted was fixed 
even though the sculpture247 at each different exhibition site bloomed 
differently and created a “noticeably different ‘Puppy’”248 at each new 
location. 
V.  OTHER COUNTRIES PROVIDE A MODEL FOR A COPYRIGHT SYSTEM 
THAT INCLUDES TRANSITORY WORKS 
From the moral rights perspective ensconced in the Berne Convention, 
the increasing complexity and uncertainty regarding the fixation standard 
and the exclusion for transitory works can be seen as a formalistic legal trap 
that will deny copyright protection to work that is otherwise creative, 
original, and worthy of protection. 
A.  Copyright Systems in Civil Law Countries Often Function  
Without a Fixation Requirement 
The Berne Convention allows nations to choose whether to require 
fixation.249  Generally, common law countries—such as the United States 
and England—require fixation, while civil law countries—including 
France,250 Spain,251 and Switzerland252—do not.253  Continental European 
 
 243. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 301. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Ericsson, supra note 235, at 382. 
 246. Id. at 381. 
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civil law nations view copyright as a tool for protecting an author’s 
relationship to his or her work.254  At the policy level, one reason these 
countries do not require fixation is to give authors the right of 
divulgation.255  The core principle is that authors have the right to choose to 
keep their work private by withholding publication.256  Fixation as a 
requirement is inconsistent with the core philosophy of French copyright 
law.  The right of divulgation often comes into play in situations where an 
author’s extemporaneous or unfinished work is copied without consent. 
Despite the absence of a fixation requirement, most civil law countries 
require that a work exist in an expression to qualify for copyright 
protection.  An expression must be perceptible and display organization to a 
degree that the work is more than an idea, but shows the author’s input.  An 
expression may be perceptible by a machine, rather than a human (such is 
the case for computer software).  In Germany, a work must exist in 
perceptible form, rather than a material form.257 The broader concept of an 
“expression” includes works that U.S. copyright law would consider fixed 
for only a transitory duration.  It also includes media that are stable enough 
for the expression to be perceived sufficiently, such as ice sculptures, air 
cutting, and hairstyles.258  A speech by famed psychoanalyst Jacques 
Lacan, for example, was later published by a third party.259  The Paris Court 
of First Instance held that the speech qualified for copyright protection once 
it was made perceptible, here by spoken word.260  Thus, Lacan and his 
assignees have the right to prevent others from fixing the speech.261  In 
addition, the Paris Supreme Court for Judicial Matters found that 
unauthorized photographs of a fashion show infringed the copyright over 
the shows as performances.262  This decision was not entirely expected 
because fashion shows fall within the category of choreographic works, and 
the French code only protects choreographic works that are fixed.263  
However, in interpreting the requirement, the court held that the fixation 
was merely an evidentiary requirement for the infringement action, not a 
prerequisite for the existence of copyright.264 
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A Dutch case addressed the contours of copyrightability and fixation 
when it considered whether a perfume was copyrightable.265 The Dutch 
high court held that the smell of the perfume was copyrightable, but not the 
mixture.266  Lancôme defined the bounds of the perfume as that scent that is 
inside the bottle.267  The court agreed that the scent inside the bottle is 
sufficiently stable and objectively determinable to be perceived; that is not 
to say that it is fixed for more than a transitory duration, as the smell moves 
and changes, but the defined bounds of that scent in the bottle were 
perceptible.268 The court noted some practical problems associated with 
protecting works that are not perceptible visually or aurally.  For example, 
it is extremely difficult for an average observer to determine if one perfume 
takes enough of the scent of a competitor’s perfume to find the Dutch 
version of substantial similarity.  The court contended that copyright law is 
accustomed to dealing with these problems, pointing to computer software 
infringement cases, which are highly expert dependent.269 
These countries provide an illustration of copyright systems that function 
without a fixation requirement.  While our recommendation is to maintain a 
fixation requirement to determine the metes and bounds of an artistic 
expression, these countries demonstrate that it is possible to do so even 
while including transitory works. 
B.  In Countries Without a Fixation Requirement, Fixation  
Still Serves a Valuable Practical Function 
In countries that do not require fixation for copyright protection, a 
fixation requirement still serves a valuable evidentiary function.  Often the 
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only way an author can prove that an alleged infringing work is 
substantially similar to a protectable work of the author is by producing a 
fixation.  According to one French law scholar, for certain types of works, 
such as performances, a fixation’s evidentiary value is so important that it is 
nearly a de facto requirement, although not a statutory requirement.270  As 
discussed above, we argue that extending copyrightability to transitory 
works would not have much of an impact on the tendency of creators to fix 
their works.  Countries without a fixation requirement can serve as a model 
in this regard.  Fixing a work in a form that is not transitory can be of great 
practical value; however, works that are transitory in nature should not be 
excluded from the purview of copyright. 
VI.  VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT AS AN  
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL 
There will undoubtedly remain commentators who do not find the overall 
benefit of removing the “transitory duration” exclusion sufficient to 
outweigh the perceived negative impact of extending copyright protection 
to a whole new class of previously unprotected works.271  As we noted 
above, if removal of the “transitory duration” exclusion in the Copyright 
Act is not justified, contemporary art should nonetheless receive 
preferential treatment under U.S. copyright law via its moral rights 
provisions. 
A.  VARA’s History Suggests That Courts Have Interpreted  
Moral Rights Too Narrowly 
The enactment of VARA, as an amendment to the Copyright Act, 
introduced moral rights to U.S. federal law.272  Moral rights exist 
independently of economic rights; they are personal rights that vest in the 
author of a creative work.273  Unlike the rest of American copyright law, 
moral rights are not linked to economic interests, but rather focus on the 
intrinsic nature and cultural value of art.274 
VARA grants to the author of a “work of visual art” the moral rights of 
attribution and integrity.275  The right of attribution ensures both that artists 
are correctly identified with the works of art that they create, and that they 
can disclaim authorship of works that are not theirs or that have been 
distorted, mutilated, or otherwise modified in such a way that would be 
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prejudicial to their honor or reputation.276  The right to integrity allows an 
artist to prevent or claim damages for (1) an intentional distortion, 
mutilation, or modification of a work that would be prejudicial to the 
artist’s honor or reputation, or (2) an intentional or grossly negligent 
destruction of a work of recognized stature.277  While there are certain 
limitations on the works and the artists that are covered by the statute, 
VARA seeks to protect both reputations of certain visual artists and the 
works that they create.278 
Works of visual arts are granted additional protection because of the 
unique character of such art and the special societal purpose served by such 
works.  While other copyrightable material can be copied and reproduced, 
works of visual art exist only in the original; thus, the original is justified in 
earning special privileges. 
[T]he works of visual art covered by H.R. 2690 are limited to originals:  
works created in single copies or in limited editions. They are generally 
not physically transformed to suit the purposes of different markets. 
Further, when an original of a work of visual art is modified or destroyed, 
it cannot be replaced. This is not the case when one copy of a work 
produced in potentially unlimited copies is altered.279 
Therefore, Congress’s intent was to grant additional rights to works that 
have the risk of being irrevocably lost if the original is damaged, altered, or 
destroyed, as opposed to a mass-produced work that is not similarly 
vulnerable.280  Moreover, Congress recognized that visual arts meet a 
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special societal need; their protection and preservation serve an important 
public interest.281  Representative Edward Markey elaborated, 
Artists in this country play a very important role in capturing the essence 
of culture and recording it for future generations.  It is often through art 
that we are able to see truths, both beautiful and ugly.  Therefore, I 
believe it is paramount to the integrity of our culture that we preserve the 
integrity of our artworks as expressions of the creativity of the artist.282 
As such, while Congress was initially reluctant to include moral rights in 
U.S. copyright law, the genuine importance of such rights is recognized and 
given some measure of weight. 
The concept of moral rights is derived from the nineteenth-century 
French concept of droit moral, wherein the personal intangible relationship 
is protected separately from financial interests and ownership of a work.283  
Moral rights derive from the theory of natural rights and are based on the 
notion that  “an author has the right to reap the fruits of his creations, obtain 
rewards for his contributions to society, and protect the integrity of his 
creations as extensions of his personality.”284 
European moral rights laws are significantly more extensive than those 
recognized in the United States.285  First, many European countries grant 
artists other moral rights in addition to attribution and integrity, such as the 
right of divulgation and the right to repent or retake a work at any time in 
exchange for payment.286  Second, moral rights in most countries are 
inalienable, unlike VARA in which moral rights can be waived and only 
last during the artist’s lifetime.287  Thus, artists in other countries have 
greater noneconomic rights to their work than they have in the United 
States.288 
Most civil law countries have long recognized moral rights and afford 
moral rights protection in compliance with the Berne Convention.289  The 
Berne Convention states in Article 6bis: 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer 
of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the 
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, 
or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.290 
Thus, the Berne Convention creates (1) the right to claim paternity of the 
work and (2) the right to the work’s integrity. 
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The United States was the last major industrialized country to join the 
Berne Convention, and one of the reasons for this delay was debate over 
moral rights protection.291  Subsequently, Congress did not provide explicit 
protection for moral rights in the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 
1988, because it found that existing legal protection with other causes of 
action such as defamation, unfair competition, breach of contract, and 
violation of the Lanham Act satisfactorily met all obligations under 
Berne.292  The Act was passed only after Congress determined that U.S. 
copyright law would not have to be amended to meet the requirements of 
Article 6.293  Two years later, VARA was finally approved when the 
approach to moral rights was minimalist. 
While the Berne Convention implementation prompted greater debate 
about the rights of artists, efforts to enact artists’ rights laws had begun well 
before that time.  In fact, bills seeking to protect visual artists were 
introduced in Congress in 1979.294  States even took action to protect moral 
rights.  California was the first state to statutorily protect artists, and it 
passed the California Art Preservation Act in 1979.295  This was followed 
by New York’s enactment of the Artist’s Authorship Rights Act in 1983, 
and nine other states have since passed similar moral rights statutes.296 
VARA has a very limited scope, and only certain types of visual art are 
offered the extra protection of moral rights.297  As such, VARA does not 
provide moral rights to all authors of works that are otherwise 
copyrightable.  The definition of protected art under VARA is a narrower 
subcategory of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” that are eligible 
for copyright.298 
More precisely, VARA only protects works falling into the carefully 
delineated and narrow category of “works of visual art,”299 which is defined 
as: 
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a 
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and 
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, 
in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that 
are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or 
other identifying mark of the author; or 
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, 
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited 
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edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively 
numbered by the author.300 
Therefore, the rights granted by VARA pertain only to certain physical 
embodiments of works present in single copies or in fewer than 200 copies 
if they are signed and consecutively numbered.  Moreover, VARA excludes 
certain types of visual arts from the purview of moral rights. It omits many 
utilitarian and mass-produced works.301  Specifically, the statute explicitly 
does not include: 
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, 
applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, 
magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic 
information service, electronic publication, or similar 
publication; 
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive,  
covering, or packaging material or container; 
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii); 
(B) any work made for hire; or 
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.302 
Noticeably, the list of works that fail to qualify is much longer than the list 
of works that are entitled to extra protection.  Congress meant to distinguish 
works of visual art from other media, such as audio-visual works and 
motion pictures, due to the different circumstances surrounding how works 
of each genre are produced and disseminated.303  According to legislative 
history, Congress excluded these particular works because it did not believe 
that the authors of these types of work would have the same type of close 
personal connection to the work that painters or sculptors would have to 
their pieces.304 
The language of the statute also makes it clear that VARA supplements 
general copyright protection.  A “work of visual art” explicitly excludes any 
uncopyrighted work;305 so, to be eligible for moral rights protection under 
VARA, a work must first satisfy standards of basic copyrightability.306  
Therefore, limiting the scope of the Copyright Act simultaneously 
constricts the types of works available for protection under VARA. 
For modern artists who work in dynamic media, this exclusion from 
VARA protection is yet another blow.  Not only do they lack economic 
rights to their works, but the absence of that protection also necessarily 
means they are devoid of any personal moral rights in their works.  While 
moral rights have been carefully and cautiously granted, intended only for a 
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very specific type of art, excluding valuable art that happens to be in a 
potentially unfixed medium cannot be the goal. 
In Kelley, the Seventh Circuit found that VARA’s scope was markedly 
limited.  It stated: 
VARA’s definition of “work of visual art” operates to narrow and focus 
the statute’s coverage; only a “painting, drawing, print, or sculpture,” or 
an exhibition photograph will qualify.  These terms are not further 
defined, but the overall structure of the statutory scheme clearly 
illuminates the limiting effect of this definition. . . .  To qualify for moral-
rights protection under VARA, Wildflower Works cannot just be 
“pictorial” or “sculptural” in some aspect or effect, it must actually be a 
“painting” or a “sculpture.” Not metaphorically or by analogy, but 
really.307 
But the court’s rigid conclusion is not explicitly conveyed in the statute or 
legislative history.  The lack of universal support for such a severe reading 
of VARA is illustrated by the ruling of the district court in which it found 
Wildflower Works could be classified as both a painting and a sculpture for 
VARA purposes.308  The language of the scant legislative history offers 
more latitude than the Seventh Circuit indicates.  Congress understood the 
constantly evolving nature of art, so it created a somewhat flexible statute 
and instructed the courts to “use common sense and generally accepted 
standards of the artistic community in determining whether a particular 
work falls within the scope of the definition.”309  Generally accepted 
standards can vary at a particular time and can evolve, so this offers some 
freedom for interpretation. 
Importantly, the legislative history continues on to provide guidance for 
what Congress intends to fall within the definition of “work of visual art”: 
Artists may work in a variety of media, and use any number of materials 
in creating their works.  Therefore, whether a particular work falls within 
the definition should not depend on the medium or materials used.  For 
example, the term “painting” includes murals, works created on canvas, 
and the like.  The term “sculpture” includes, but is not limited to, castings, 
carvings, modelings, and constructions.310 
Therefore, the plain language of VARA and the legislative history is not as 
inflexible as the Kelley court interprets it to be.  The legislative history 
suggests that Congress wanted to protect general categories of art.311  For 
instance, the examples of acceptable “paintings” and “sculptures” are 
nonexhaustive, so Congress leaves room for other options.312  Furthermore, 
the language discussing media and materials is crucial for contemporary 
works at issue.  The materials chosen, such as flowers, and animals are 
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precisely what exclude them from copyright protection (due to fixation and 
authorship issues), but the legislative history of VARA indicates Congress 
wanted the opposite result. 
Depending on how broadly Congress intended the words to be defined, 
contemporary artworks may fall under the language of VARA if not 
excluded because of uncopyrightability.  The protected art, “a painting, 
drawing, print or sculpture,” could potentially apply to works such as 
Victimless Leather and other pieces composed of living matter because the 
groupings are not finite, and the materials chosen should not determine 
eligibility.  This possibility indicates that VARA should not be a subunit of 
copyright, but should rather be a separate inquiry altogether. 
B.  VARA Protection Should Be Offered for  
Contemporary Art 
VARA protection should be expanded to include various forms of 
contemporary art, regardless of the chosen medium.  This advance would 
further the goals of the Intellectual Property Clause, would move to greater 
align the United States with other countries, would underscore the 
importance that Congress places on the value of visual arts to culture, and 
would protect works that are otherwise vulnerable. 
European moral rights laws are far more comprehensive than the limited 
moral rights available in the United States, and this disparity seems to 
undermine the underlying purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause to 
promote the progress of useful arts.313  Moral rights incentivize creativity in 
a way that economic rights simply do not.  They both complement each 
other, but each is important on its own.  Since other countries offer more 
moral rights than merely attribution and integrity, and they do so for a 
wider range of types of works, it is not far-fetched for the United States to 
broaden VARA protection and offer limited moral rights to a larger scope 
of works under the visual arts umbrella.  As Congress stated, “The theory of 
moral rights is that they result in a climate of artistic worth and honor that 
encourages the author in the arduous act of creation.”314  Thus, including 
artists that work in dynamic media within the coverage of moral rights 
would be consistent with the purpose behind copyright “‘[t]o promote the 
Progress of . . . useful Arts.’”315  Encouraging the development of new and 
inventive types of art would further the central goal of nurturing creativity, 
and works that would otherwise fall under the language of the statute—if 
not denied VARA protection because they are uncopyrightable—would 
finally be included. 
The rationale for statutory exclusions, that the artists in such works do 
not have an intimate connection to the piece, is understandable for genres 
such as motion pictures and audiovisual works; however, it is unfounded in 
works of visual arts that simply fail to achieve copyright protection.  While 
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the work is currently uncopyrightable because of the chosen medium, the 
artist still has a profound relationship to the work.  As Andy Goldsworthy 
states, 
I enjoy the freedom of just using my hands and “found” tools—a sharp 
stone, the quill of a feather, thorns.  I take the opportunities each day 
offers . . . .  I stop at a place or pick up a material because I feel that there 
is something to be discovered.  Here is where I can learn.316 
The artist is just as passionate and connected to the final product as if it 
were in a more permanent form.  Consequently, the exclusion from VARA 
is unjustified. 
Additionally, each congressional justification for additional rights for 
visual arts applies as strongly to contemporary visual arts.  Bioart and 
temporary installations exist in only one form, that of an original, so they 
have the same vulnerabilities as works of copyrightable visual art.  
Furthermore, as Representative Markey recognized, visual artists benefit the 
public by capturing aspects of the culture; consequently, preserving their 
creative expressions is a worthy endeavor.317  Contemporary visual 
artworks are similarly valuable to society, so they are equally deserving of 
moral rights. 
Moreover, moral rights may even be more important to contemporary 
works than others.  Postmodern art is more susceptible to forgery than 
representational works, and it is more difficult to determine the difference 
between the counterfeit and authentic works of contemporary art.318  Thus, 
rights to paternity are crucial for artists to maintain the integrity of their 
name and their work.  Currently, the issues of copying are less prevalent 
because there is less incentive to do so, but this could change in the future.  
Additionally, pieces that gradually grow and evolve may eventually stray 
from the parameters of the original idea or design.  In such an instance, the 
artist’s integrity is at issue and he should dictate the adjustments to the work 
to maintain the original concept.319  In certain works of bioart, “the integrity 
or wholeness of the piece is a developing construct, and the integrity of the 
piece encompasses this motion and development in ways that are often 
more difficult to anticipate than traditional moving sculptures.”320 
As Congress has acknowledged, because of the limited nature of VARA, 
it protects the legitimate interests of visual artists without infringing on the 
rights of copyright owners and without undue interference with the 
operation of the copyright system.321  Thus, including cutting-edge 
contemporary works within such curtailed protections would similarly not 
impede, or in any way burden, the current copyright system.  But it would 
have a greater symbolic effect as to the acknowledged value and 
contribution of such works. 
 
 316. Andy Goldsworthy, supra note 33. 
 317. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 6. 
 318. Cronin, supra note 6, at 251. 
 319. Oliver, supra note 64, at 6. 
 320. Id. at 10. 
 321. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 10. 
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CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated by the movements in contemporary art that emphasize 
process over product, modern art is exploring new media of expression.  
These advances are exciting and have been recognized for their value, but 
copyright law currently fails to protect major strains of this visual art.  
Excluding works that have transitory elements—through natural materials, 
living or digital media, or aspects of performance—leaves many 
contemporary artists without economic rights.  Demanding copyright 
protection as a prerequisite for VARA protection further disadvantages 
modern artists by additionally denying them moral rights.  This end result 
runs counter to the central purpose of copyright law to promote useful arts.  
Similarly, excluding works that use transitory materials violates the 
Bleistein nondiscrimination principle by conveying the unstated message 
that copyright law values it less. 
As it stands today, copyright law and VARA leave many contemporary 
artists without economic or moral rights.  But, this end result runs counter 
to the central purpose of copyright law:  to encourage creative expression.  
Because the current state of the law does not comply with its stated goals, 
action must be taken.  In encapsulating the preceding discussion the 
following policy prescriptions appear appropriate. 
First, Congress should expand the scope of copyright law.  The 
protections afforded by copyright law have consistently expanded since the 
original Act of 1790, and Congress should act to broaden coverage once 
again.322  Historically, as new forms of creative expression developed, 
Congress extended copyrightability to reach these new types of media.323  
Such is the case today.  Contemporary artists are using new media that 
involve dynamic materials, and Congress should change the language and 
current understanding of the law to make such modern works copyrightable.  
This goal could be achieved by eliminating the “transitory duration” 
exclusion for copyrightability.  This language is not necessary to the 
copyright system, so Congress should eliminate such a requirement from 
the copyright statute.  As discussed, it is unnecessary to a determination of 
the parameters of artistic expression.  In addition, other countries do not 
require it, and state copyright systems that protect unfixed works prove that 
the U.S. system would function well without such a demand.  Moreover, 
case law leads to great uncertainty about the threshold necessary to satisfy 
the “more than a transitory duration” requirement for fixation.  The level of 
stability required is unclear, and the Kelley court created an ill-defined 
 
 322. This is not to say, however, that copyright law is not overbroad in many other 
respects.  The low originality standard and narrow interpretations of fair use are two (of 
many) areas where copyright law is overbroad. 
 323. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (“The history of copyright law has been one of 
gradual expansion in the types of works accorded protection, and the subject matter affected 
by this expansion has fallen into two general categories.  In the first, scientific discoveries 
and technological developments have made possible new forms of creative expression that 
never existed before. . . .  In other cases, such as photographs, sound recordings, and motion 
pictures, statutory enactment was deemed necessary to give them full recognition as 
copyrightable works.”). 
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“essence test” that offers little guidance for future cases.324  Congress could 
adopt a policy similar to Belgium, France, Brazil, and others wherein 
copyright protection is granted once the work is in a form that others can 
perceive, even if that perception involves change over time.  A perception 
requirement would be a logical alternative because the copyright statute 
mentions works that can be “perceived” when delineating the boundaries of 
copyrightable subject matter.325  Even the current definition of fixation 
focuses on the perceivability of the work rather than offering much insight 
into the necessary stability.326  Consequently, the “transitory duration” 
language should be stricken from the statute. 
Second, courts should interpret “fixation,” “authorship,” and VARA 
language broadly.  The task of deciphering the scope of the statutory grant 
of copyright protection and VARA rights has been left to the courts in many 
ways.  Numerous core terms are left undefined, such as “works of 
authorship” in the Copyright Act and “painting, drawing, print or sculpture” 
in VARA.  Legislative history suggests an expansive reading of each, so 
courts retain a great deal of interpretive power.  Further, much ambiguity 
remains even in the language that defines crucial components like 
“fixation.”  Because courts have been entrusted with the power of 
determining the breadth of the vague statutory language, they should do so 
flexibly and according to the purpose of copyright.  Thus, if Congress 
chooses not to modify the Copyright Act, courts should respond by 
furthering the stated goals of copyright by interpreting “fixation,” 
“authorship,” and “painting, drawing, print or sculpture” more broadly. 
As discussed, the limits of “fixation” have become blurred, and the 
nebulous nature of that requirement allows courts great leeway in their final 
determination.  By conceptualizing fixation very broadly, that statutory 
demand could, in effect, be eliminated.  This result may be achieved by 
interpreting the demands of “fixation” as being very similar to, if not nearly 
equal to, “perception.”  This would be reasonable because perception is 
stated in the definition of fixation and also functions well as the rule in 
other countries.  Alternatively, courts could interpret fixation with even less 
onerous standards.  Therefore, if Congress fails to remove the “transitory 
duration” language from the Copyright Act, the superfluous requirement 
can be muted for all intents and purposes through court action. 
Additionally, courts should interpret the scope of VARA, particularly the 
definitions of “painting, drawing, print or sculpture,” more expansively than 
they have in the past.327  Legislative history’s examples of the different 
categories of visual arts are nonexhaustive, and it indicates that courts 
should use common sense and generally accepted standards of the artistic 
 
 324. See Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 305 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 325. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). Copyright protection is granted to “original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from 
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.” Id. 
 326. Id. § 101. 
 327. See Kelley, 635 F.3d at 300. 
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community to determine VARA coverage.328  These guidelines offer courts 
significant interpretive latitude, so courts can, and should be, more 
inclusive.  Moreover, the chosen medium should not eliminate a work from 
protection.329  The use of living matter does not undermine the suitability of 
works for VARA coverage, so contemporary works have a greater 
likelihood of earning moral rights.  Because Congress intended for the 
definition of “painting, drawing, print or sculpture” to retain some 
flexibility, courts should offer works more leeway when considering 
whether they fall within the realm of VARA. 
Finally, VARA moral rights should not be linked to copyrightability.  If 
the boundaries of the current Copyright Act remain in place, VARA should 
be expanded to offer moral rights to visually artistic works, even if the work 
is not otherwise copyrightable.  Legislative history and the district court in 
Kelley indicate that contemporary works using live and impermanent media 
can be “paintings” or “sculptures” of visual art, thereby falling within the 
scope of VARA coverage.  Thus, eliminating the copyrightability 
requirement from VARA would provide contemporary artists with some 
protection.  Moreover, the language of the statute suggests that isolating 
VARA coverage from copyright protection would be a reasonable move.  
Section 106A says, “independent of the exclusive rights provided in section 
106,” so the VARA and copyrightability inquiries could easily be separate 
considerations.330  Furthermore, equitabile concerns suggest that economic 
rights and moral rights do not need to be an all-or-nothing scenario:  if 
works that include dynamic media are not granted copyright protection, that 
decision should not eliminate valuable works from VARA coverage as well. 
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